permanence in the post should be defined,” “in order to guarantee that these judges will not be removed from their posts because of the rulings they make or based on arbitrary decisions” against them. 91. The State indicated that, “[t]he absence of a guarantee of stability and permanence for provisional judges is fully and legally justified, [because] provisional judges enter the Judiciary without having passed the competitive examination.” In this regard, the State indicated that “the standard [of judicial independence] argued by the [Inter-American Commission] was not constituted in this case,” because it “does not conform to the provisions of Article 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, since [it did not take into account] the teachings of [Cecilia Medina Quiroga,] one of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.”119 The State argued that, according to the said legal doctrine: There is no single solution for designing a system of appointments, promotions and transfers of judges that fully provides for their independence. There are States in which the appointment is left exclusively to the Executive; others, in which the system involves a second body, which can be the Judiciary itself, or Congress; more developed models create an independent body to handle these tasks; lastly, there are States in which the judges are elected by popular vote.” 92. The State also indicated that the said legal doctrine underscores the following problems for judicial independence: (i) the appointment of judges by “popular election,” owing to the “risk of politicization”; (ii) “the participation of political bodies such as Congress,” which could “politicize the appointment of the judges,” and (iii) “a short mandate,” because this makes “it difficult for the judge to uphold his points of view […] before the body that will determine his appointment. Therefore, if the post is not subject to tenure, terminating only when certain circumstances arise such as misconduct, illness or other, it is advisable that, at least, the mandate be long.” Finally, the State indicated that judicial “independence can only be achieved when the funding of the judicial system is in the hands of the system itself, and not in those of the Executive or Congress, and when the remuneration of the judges allows them to subsist in the same way as other professionals.” 93. Based on the foregoing, the State argued that the appointment of Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón complied with the standard of judicial independence, because it can “clearly be concluded that judges will have greater independence when they are appointed by the Judiciary itself, as in this case.” Also, the State argued that the above-mentioned legal doctrine “contradicts the argument put forward by the [Inter-American Commission] when it mentioned that the legally relevant issue is that the time frame should be defined, which does not distinguish whether that time frame should be long or short. In addition, curiously, it disregards the fact that, […] while it is true that the alleged victim in this case was not appointed for a specific term, it is also true that the alleged victim performed her functions as a judge for a very long period of time.” In addition, the State indicated that “the cited teachings of the distinguished publicist […] makes it clear that there is an evident distinction between the stability enjoyed by permanent and provisional judges, because it establishes that only the former shall be removed owing to misconduct, illness, or other factors, duly proved through the corresponding disciplinary procedure,” and that, “although provisional judges do not have stability in the performance of their functions, they should have a long mandate.” Lastly, the State 119 Article 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that, “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” are a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” As an example of this type of legal doctrine, the State cites what the former President of the Inter-American Court, Cecilia Medina Quiroga, indicated in her book, “La Convención Americana: teoría and jurisprudencia - vida, integridad personal, libertad personal, debido proceso and recurso judicial,” supra note 25. 30