powers is to guarantee the independence of judges.121 The purpose of the protection is to prevent the judicial system in general and its members in particular from finding themselves subject to possible undue restrictions in the exercise of their function, imposed by bodies outside the Judiciary or even by those judges who exercise review or appellate functions.122 98. According to the case law of this Court and of the European Court, as well as according to the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (hereinafter “Basic Principles”), the following guarantees are derived from judicial independence: an adequate appointment process123 tenure in the post124 and guarantees against external pressure.125 99. Among the aspects of tenure relevant for this case, the Basic Principles establish that, “[t]he term of office of judges […] shall be adequately secured by law”126 and that “[j]udges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.”127 Also, the Human Rights Committee has indicated that “[j]udges may be dismissed only on serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence and in accordance with fair procedures ensuring objectivity and impartiality set out in the Constitution or the law.”128 This Court has made use of these principles and has 121 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, para. 73; Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 55, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 67. 122 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 121, para. 55, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 67. 123 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 121, para. 75; Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 121, para. 138, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 70. See also, ECHR: Case of Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80, para. 78; ECHR. Case of Langborger v. Sweden, Judgment of 22 January 1989, Series A no. 155, para. 32, and Principle 10 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted at the seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan, Italy, from August 26 to September 6, 1985, and confirmed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985, and 40/146 of December 13, 1985. The Basic Principles emphasize integrity, suitability and training or appropriate legal qualifications as fundamental elements in the appointment of judges. Similarly, all the decisions related to the professional career of judges must be based on objective criteria, with the judge’s personal merit, qualifications, integrity, ability and appropriate training being the fundamental elements to take into consideration. The Court underlines that in the Reverón case, it specified that, when States establish procedures for the appointment of their judges, they must take into account that not just any procedure satisfies the conditions required by the Convention for the adequate implementation of a truly independent regime. If basic parameters of objectivity and reasonableness are not respected, it would be possible to design a regime that permitted a high degree of discretionary authority in the selection of career judicial personnel, owing to which the individuals selected would not necessarily be the most suitable. Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 74. 124 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 121, para. 75; Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 121, para. 138, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 70. See also, Principle 12 of the United Nations Basic Principles, supra note 123. 125 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 121, para. 75, Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, supra note 120, para. 156, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 70. See also Principles 2, 3 and 4 of the United Nations Basic Principles, supra note 123. 126 Cf. Principle 11 of the United Nations Basic Principles, supra note 123. 127 Cf. Principle 12 of the United Nations Basic Principles, supra note 123. 128 Cf. United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14, Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, para. 20. Also, in the same General Comment, the Committee stated that, “[t]he dismissal of judges by the executive, e.g. before the expiry of the term for which they have been appointed, without any specific reasons given to them and without effective judicial protection being available to contest the dismissal is incompatible with the independence of the judiciary.” In addition, the Basic Principles establish that judges “shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that 32