based on “comments” received. The Commission indicated that, “[i]n the case of [Mrs.] Chocrón Chocrón […] no disciplinary procedure intervened; but rather her removal was ordered by the SCJ Judicial Commission which, for more than a decade, has appointed and removed hundreds of judges under the so-called transition process of the Judiciary.” The Commission and the representatives argued that the CFRSJ was the body “responsible for exercising disciplinary functions in the case of members of the Judiciary, [because] the Judicial Commission does not have constitutional or legal authority to exercise disciplinary powers over the judges or officials of the Judiciary, or to remove or annul previous appointments.” 113. The representatives indicated that the State “appeared to be shielding itself behind a kind of absolute immunity from administrative and judicial oversight by indicating that the possibility of removing provisional and/or substitute judges is a discretionary power which it understands is not subject to any substantive limit, to the extent that it does not even refer to, much less explain, the supposed ‘comments’ that resulted in the decision to annul the appointment of [Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón].” Thus, according to the representatives, “if any kind of comment, complaint or accusation against [Mrs.] Chocrón [Chocrón] existed, she had the right to know about it in order to exercise her defense.” In addition, the representatives emphasized that, “since no procedure existed for the removal of [Mrs.] Chocrón Chocrón, evidently she was not granted the right to exercise her defense upon learning the reasons for which she was being dismissed.” They also indicated that “the Venezuelan State cannot attempt to justify the competence of the Judicial Commission […] by arguing that the annulment of the appointment of a provisional judge is not a disciplinary measure, but a simple discretionary decision, without providing any grounds.” The representatives added that ”the removal of [Mrs.] Chocrón Chocrón from her post constitutes a disciplinary measure, because an attempt is made to base it on supposed ‘comments that were made to [the] Judicial Commission’; thus, the annulment of her appointment was based on some alleged comments, wrongful acts, complaints or even rumors presented to that administrative body. Consequently, this was a reaction decision, responding to the need to punish an alleged unlawful conduct.” They also argued that the annulment of the appointment was comparable to a disciplinary sanction, because it “affects the sphere of the rights […] of the provisional, temporary, substitute or pro tempore judge, since it consists in the deprivation of a right, [such as] the annulment of a favorable decision, the loss of an expectation or a right, or the imposing of an obligation to pay a fine.” 114. For its part, the State indicated that, “[t]he Judicial Commission does not function as a disciplinary body, but rather as an administrator in the appointment of the judges, as well as in the annulment of these appointments at any time, in accordance with case law, which has established that this is a discretionary decision of the Commission. Hence, it was not the facts argued by the alleged victim that led to her removal from the post, but the Judicial Commission’s exercise of its discretionary powers to annul the appointment of temporary judges.” Therefore, the State reiterated that “the Judicial Commission is fully competent, because it constitutes parallelism, in that the body that issued the decision granting the post to [Mrs.] Chocrón Chocrón is the same one that annulled that decision.” 4.2. Considerations of the Court 115. This Court has indicated that any public authority, whether administrative, legislative or judicial, whose decisions may affect the rights of the individual can be required to adopt the said decisions with full respect for the guarantees of due legal 36