128. Moreover, as the Court has indicated previously, when evaluating the effectiveness of remedies filed in the domestic administrative law jurisdiction,164 the Court must observe whether the decisions made in it have made an effective contribution to ending a situation that violated rights, by ensuring the non-repetition of the harmful actions and guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the rights protected by the Convention.165 The Court does not evaluate the effectiveness of the remedies filed based on an eventual ruling favorable to the interests of the victim. 129. In this regard, the Court observes that, in the instant case, the Judicial Commission and the Political and Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice based their decisions, fundamentally, on the argument that the said Commission can annul the appointment of provisional or temporary judges in a discretionary manner. Indeed, according to the evidence in the case file, in Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón’s case, the two bodies merely indicated, in response to the arguments of the victim, that “the Judicial Commission has the power to appoint judges provisionally and to annul their appointment when the majority of its members decide this”166 (supra paras. 84, 85, 87 and 88). Thus, the Court considers that, in response to the remedies filed by Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón, she did not receive a response that could have safeguarded the minimum requirements of justification and the right of defense in relation to the administrative decision issued against her. The response received prevented an effective challenge of the Judicial Commission’s decision owing to the use of a criterion contrary to the principle of judicial independence (supra para. 89). 130. Based on the above, the Court finds that the State violated the right to judicial protection recognized in Article 25(1), in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón. 6. Permanence in public office under equal conditions 6.1. Arguments of the parties 131. The representatives alleged a violation of Article 23(1)(c) of the Convention,167 because “it is evident that, in Venezuela, the general conditions of access and permanence of provisional and permanent judges are not the same, […] because the former are officials who are freely appointed and removed while the latter have stability, autonomy and independence.” They indicated that “[t]he illegitimate distinction between permanent judges and provisional judges” that was allegedly applied to Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón “to annul her appointment as a judge […] violated her right to access, permanence, promotion and eventual retirement in the Judiciary.” They added that this “distinction is clearly arbitrary and capricious,” because “it is neither reasonable nor legitimate that some judges can be removed in a discretionary manner [and others not].” 164 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, supra note 22, para. 210; Case of the “La Rochela Massacre” v. Colombia, supra note 16, para. 217; Case of the Ituango Massacres, supra note 16, para. 338, and Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 136, para. 206. 165 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, supra note 164, para. 214; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, supra note 164, para. 339, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, supra note 30, para. 139. 166 Judgment No. 01798 of the Political and Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, supra note 116, folios 496 and 497. 167 The pertinent part of Article 23(1) establishes the following: Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: […] (c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country. 41