48. The Court has also held that Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention refers to an ordinary, accessible, and effective remedy—that is, it should not require greater complexity that makes this right illusory. In this sense, the formalities required for the appeal to be admitted must be minimal and must not constitute an obstacle for it to fulfill its purpose of reviewing and resolving the claims put forward by the appellant—that is, it must provide results or answers for the purposes for which it was conceived. It must be understood that, regardless of the appeals regime or system adopted by States Parties and what they call the measures provided for challenging a conviction, in order for it to be effective, it must constitute an adequate means for seeking correction of an erroneous conviction. The remedy, therefore, must be capable of analyzing the factual, evidentiary, and legal basis for the judgment being challenged, given that court judgments entail an interplay between factual determinations and application of the law, such that an erroneous determination of facts would mean an erroneous or undue application of the law. Consequently, the grounds for admitting the remedy must make it possible to review broadly the aspects of the guilty verdict being challenged.76 49. The Court recalls that Mr. Gorigoitía was convicted on September 12, 1997, by the First Criminal Chamber of Mendoza for the crime of simple homicide (supra para. 30). On September 29, 1997, Mr. Gorigoitía's defense attorney filed a cassation appeal requesting the annulment of the conviction, which was sent before the Supreme Court of Mendoza (supra para. 33 and 35). There is no dispute that, under Argentine law, the cassation appeal is the appropriate remedy for challenging a criminal conviction of a person pursuant to the provisions of article 503 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Province of Mendoza, in force at the time of the facts (supra para. 42). However, the state argued that no broader review could take place without an appeal that is properly formulated. In this regard, it argued that the appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court of Mendoza because Mr. Gorigoitía's defense attorney did not formulate it properly, something that cannot be attributed to the state. The state maintained that it was for this reason that the Court was unable to rule on matters of fact and evidence, and therefore, the state could not be found internationally responsible for the violation of Article 8.2.h) of the Convention. 50. The Court observes that Mr. Gorigoitía's defense raised two central arguments in its cassation appeal requesting annulment of the conviction handed down by the First Chamber on the basis of Article 503 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Province of Mendoza. In relation to the first pleading, the defense argued that: i) the duty to provide justification for the proceedings and judgments is a fundamental guarantee of the process; ii) the lack of justification means a judgment should be annulled; (iii) the duty to provide justification requires a decision that is based on the elements of evidence legally incorporated, evidence that must be assessed in accordance with logic, psychology, and common experience; (iv) negligence is a fact and as such must be proven, and v) the facts admitted by the First Chamber in its judgment never demonstrated the existence of the constitutive element of Mr. Gorigoitía's guilt. Therefore, the defense stated that the decision of the First Chamber lacked adequate reasoning, as the facts were never adequately evaluated, constituting a procedural defect. As regards the second pleading, Mr. Gorigoitía's defense argued that the assessment made by the First Chamber in establishing the judgment’s justification was unrelated to the legal provision applied, and therefore that the punishment applied was not applicable to the case. 51. The Court observes that Mr. Gorigoitía's defense did not raise arguments aimed formally at having the Supreme Court of Mendoza decide on questions of fact or assessment of the evidence. Instead, the claims were formulated to allege flaws in the procedure and argue that the First Chamber had failed to substantively apply the law. However, the Court notes that, based on the regulations set forth in article 503 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Province of Mendoza, Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, paras. 161, 164, and 165, and Case of Zegarra Marin v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of February 15, 2017. Series C No. 331, para. 172. 76 16