21 were examined elsewhere in the judgment, and on this basis the Court reached the conclusion that both Mrs. Baruet and the children mentioned in said ruling are, themselves, victims of the facts in violation, and not merely entitled, for other reasons, to property-related reparations. XVIII. Restitutio in integrum 94. It has been customary for the Court to reflect, in its judgments on reparations, the well-known idea that “reparation of the damage requires, whenever possible, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which consists of reestablishment of the prior situation.” And it has also been customary for it to immediately add: “When this is not possible, as in the instant case...”. This is so in the Tibi judgment. I also sign this statement because I agree that the best reparation would be “reestablishment of the prior situation” before the violation. However, this is not possible, as I have stated before (for example, in my Concurring opinion in the judgment on the Bámaca Velásquez case, issued on November 25, 2000). It would be like turning the hands of the clock back and returning the person whose right was abridged to the situation before that event. 95. Full restitutio is logically and materially unfeasible, except regarding formal, virtual violations, with no impact on any life, which may be suppressed, like when the erroneous or undesirable words are expelled from a computer. It involves disregarding the fateful nature of the consequences –even if they cannot be perceived immediately- of the violation committed. That is why judgments on reparations invariably state that “in the instant case” it is not possible to apply restitutio. If restitutio is not possible in any case, it may be time to go directly to what is feasible. This was graphically expressed in some early judgments of the Court, regarding the impossibility of complete reparation of all the consequences of the violation committed, as they open and expand like concentric circles on a pond when a stone is thrown into it. XIX. Taxation 96. In some of my previous Opinions I questioned the pertinence of ruling that compensations, costs and expenses –all of them items of the same type: material reparations- will be subject to no taxes. I said several times –most recently, in my Opinion attached to the November 25, 2003 judgment in the Myrna Mack Chang case- that this judicial provision entailed a modification of the tax system of a country, insofar as it led to establishing a specific assumption of tax exemption. This generally requires a concerted effort of the legislative and administrative authorities, through general or specific provisions, which are difficult and unnecessary for the purposes sought by the property-related reparations system for victims of violations. What the judgment seeks is to avoid taxation being imposed that diminishes the reparations ordered, making them illusory. Instead, it seeks to ensure that they reach the beneficiaries in full, as ordered. If that is so, then it is sufficient to say so in those or in similar terms –as the judgment to which I attach this Opinion doeswithout the need to generate difficult issues regarding generally observed tax rules. Sergio García-Ramírez Judge Pablo Saavedra-Alessandri Secretary