9 eloquent expressions or one of its most revealing negations. Describing this prosecutional labyrinth –as can be seen in the case that the Inter-American Court has decided on in this judgment- evokes in an absolutely natural manner the vicissitudes of defendant Joseph K, whom Kafka allows to wander around the uneven ground of the proceeding, without knowing what it is all about and where he is being taken. IX. Information on the charges 39. Helplessness in the proceeding itself –against which we must strive every day, with infinite patience and perseverance- is shown by attacks against certain rights and guarantees that constitute the democratic, civilized, evolved version of prosecution. One of these is the right to information on the charges against the defendant, which are the basis for the State’s action; this information goes hand in hand with the right to timely defense and that of the accused to remain silent. We cannot comprehend how these rights can still be systematically excluded, despite the accrual of constitutional provisions, legislation, and provisions of conventions, as well as the jurisprudence that asserts them and the political discourse that proclaims them. 40. What should be is set forth in Article 8(2)(b) of the American Convention: the right to “prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him.” And also, specifically, in principle 10 of the aforementioned set: “Anyone who is arrested shall be informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.” However, the distance between the principle and the facts still shows up with a disquieting regularity in the cases brought before the Inter-American Court. 41. As regards the moment in which the right to information on the charges and the right to defense must become effective, the judgment issued by the InterAmerican Court in the Case of Tibi is once again explicit: at the time of detention and before the accused renders his first statement before the authorities. It cannot be otherwise. This had already been asserted in the enlightening North American jurisprudence based on the Miranda formula, often defended as well as criticized, and it has been the opinion of the Court, in regards to a specific topic, when it issued Advisory Opinion OC-16/99. The former, citing significant precedents, asserts: “The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation”. In a similar vein, OC-16/99 asserted the right of foreign detainees to receive information on their right to seek and receive consular assistance of the State of which they are nationals, pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 42. This cannot be otherwise, if we want rights to serve the purpose for which they are enacted and to have the effect attributed to them, which of course is not impunity, but justice. When we say “before the statement”, we mean: prior to any statement before any authority –not only the Public Prosecutor’s Office, not only the court- on which the outcome of the prosecution and, therefore, of the accused and, ultimately of justice, which is put to a test in each concrete case, may depend. It is very well known that, despite statements and efforts to the contrary, the first statement usually defines the direction of the proceeding and determines its outcome. X. Judicial control 43. The Judiciary has been conceived, essentially, to ensure the rule of law in social relations: those among private persons and those between political authorities