50. Furthermore, the ICourtHR stipulated that the authority to annul the appointment of judges based on “observations” must be minimally justified and regulated, at least as regards the exact description of the facts that support these observations; also that the respective motivation shall not be of a disciplinary or punitive nature, because, if it was a disciplinary sanction, the requirement of motivation would be even greater, since disciplinary control is designed to assess the conduct, aptness and performance of the judge as a public official and, consequently, it would be necessary to analyze the seriousness of the conduct and the proportionality of the sanction.65 51. In the judgment that inspires this separate opinion, the Inter-American Court considered its case law on judicial independence, 66 and especially on guarantees in impeachment proceedings,67 based also on the relevant standards of the Human Rights Committee and the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the criteria of the European Court of Human Rights, and the recommendations of the Council of Europe on the independence, efficiency and role of judges, as well as on the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa.68 V. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: INSTITUTIONAL AND PERSONAL 52. Different concepts of judicial independence have been developed by both legal doctrine and the case law of the Inter-American Court and, in this case, it is important to stress its institutional and personal aspects. 53. According to Linares, “analytically, we are able to distinguish two dimensions of judicial independence: a negative one and a positive one. The former consists in the ability to avoid different sources of coercion and loyalty, while the latter consists in the application of law – and all its sources – to decide a specific case.”69 54. Meanwhile, Chaires distinguishes between objective-institutional and subjectivefunctional independence.70 The former is identified with the absence of external pressures on this power;71 the latter to the mechanisms to ensure that the decisions of the judge abide by the law to the greatest extent possible.72 55. Judicial independence has also been conceived based on its distinction as a value or guarantee. With regard to judicial independence as a value, its significance coincides with what is called “functional independence” (also known as “substantive” or “decisional” independence). This notion of judicial independence gives rise to the basic rule of the legal system according to which the judge, in exercise of the jurisdictional function, must be subject only to legality; that is, the system of sources of law in force. In addition, judicial 65 Ibidem, para. 120. 66 Paras. 188 to 199 of the Judgment. 67 Paras. 165 to 169 of the Judgment. 68 Paras. 188 to 199 of the Judgment. 69 Linares, Sebastián, op. cit., p. 116. 70 Chaires Zaragoza, Jorge, op. cit., p. 531. 71 Ibidem, p. 534. 72 Ibidem, p. 536. 13