ICourtHR arise from this right: the first that of the judge, and the second that of the 78 State. 60. Now, the ICourtHR has also determined that, in turn, the said obligations of the State give rise to rights for judges or for other citizens. For example, the guarantee of an adequate procedure for the appointment of judges necessarily entails the right of the citizen to accede to public office in equal conditions; the guarantee not to be subject to removal at will results in the disciplinary and sanctioning proceedings for judges necessarily respecting the guarantees of due process of law, and those prejudiced being offered an effective remedy; the guarantee of tenure should result in an adequate employment regime for the judge in which, inter alia, transfers, promotions and other conditions are sufficiently controlled and respected.79 61. The ICourtHR, in this specific case, found that “the objective dimension is related to essential aspects of the rule of law, such as the principle of the separation of powers, and the important role played by the judicial function in a democracy. Consequently, this objective dimension transcends the figure of the judge and has a collective impact on society. In addition, a direct relationship exists between the objective dimension of judicial independence and the right of judges to accede to and remain in office under general terms of equality, as an expression of their guarantee of stability.”80 Therefore, “when the permanence of judges in office is arbitrarily affected, the right to judicial independence established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention is violated, in conjunction with the right of access to and permanence in public service, under general conditions of equality, established in Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention.”81 On this point, it is relevant to emphasize that this interactive interpretation of Articles 8(1) and 23(1)(c) of the American Convention allows the ICourtHR to complement its case law in the case of Reverón Trujillo by clarifying that the institutional guarantee of judicial independence derived from Article 8(1) of the American Convention, results in a subjective right of the judge that his permanence in public office is not affected arbitrarily, under Article 23(1)(c) of the Pact of San José. VI. THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THIS CASE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH DEMOCRACY 62. In this case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights argued that it was difficult for the National Congress to be able to guarantee independence, since, by nature, it was a political body and, in particular, since it responded to interests of the Government and of parliamentary majorities, with the result that Congress did not guarantee the right to an independent judge, in its individual aspect, nor acted as such. In addition, the Commission argued that, with regard to the impeachment of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal, the expression “constitutional or statutory offenses,” and the formulation of grounds for removal did not provide clear, certain and sufficiently determined standards to safeguard the principle of judicial independence. In addition, the Commission and the victims’ representatives noted that the call to impeachment on December 1, 2004, was made after the statutory time frame had expired. Also the victims 78 Ibidem, para. 146. 79 Ibidem, para. 147. 80 Para. 198 of the Judgment. 81 Para. 199 of the Judgment. 15