[that] entails the practical exercise of a jurisdictional function by an organ with political functions, but respecting the essential formalities of a jurisdictional proceeding.”104 79. Consequently, in reality, impeachment involves mixed control: “political control” only as regards the institutional status of the organ conducting it, the offenses and the sanctions to be imposed; “legal control” because the monitoring action is subject to the law, and it is jurisdictional as regards the nature of the function and the human rights of due process of those who are tried. If those who are put on trial are members of the State’s Judiciary – or of any of the high jurisdictional organs – there are also other significant elements to consider, such as the principles of the separation of powers and, as I have expounded above, the institutional aspect of the independence of judges, which entail important practical consequences. 80. Indeed, it is only by acknowledging the “jurisdictional nature” of the function of Congress in relation to impeachment that it is possible to ensure judicial independence.105 Hence, if we wish to protect judicial independence we must consider that impeachment is an exceptional means to remove judges, and not a mechanism at the service of the parliamentary majorities to try and control the Judiciary. In other words, if it is understood that impeachment is an exceptional mechanism for the removal of judges, the exceptional nature of which seeks to protect them against undue removal, it is only fitting to continue the jurisprudential line of the ICourtHR, in the sense that, in the exercise of its function, Congress must act independently and impartially and provide the person impeached with the guarantees of due process. To the contrary, what, in principle, sought to be a guarantee of judicial independence — an exceptional proceeding for removal on limited grounds – may become a mechanism at the service of the Government in power to control or to intimidate the Judiciary.106 Expert witness Despouy had a similar opinion, when he indicated that “[when] a political entity exercises jurisdictional functions […], there is a greater risk that the basic principles of due process will be violated; hence, international jurisprudence requires the guarantee of tenure, or that the decisions are made, above all, based on predetermined grounds that are reasoned; the decisions must be well-founded; the reasons must evidently be serious because, to the contrary, [a judge] could be removed for conduct that has no significance from the point of view of his performance.”107 81. As one sector of legal doctrine has recognized, the possibility that Congress may remove judges for very lax criteria and without the appropriate guarantees of due process, jeopardizes the faculty of the courts to exercise the control of constitutionality – and we should also add the control of conformity with the Convention – in order to protect minority rights.108 Indeed, to enable judges to feel free to interpret the law without waiting for the reaction of Congress, limits must be established for the Legislature to impeach and remove 104 González Oropeza, Manuel, “Juicio político”, op. cit., p. 335. 105 On this point expert witness Despouy indicated that, in an impeachment proceeding, “the guarantees of due process of law” must be respected and “especially, in the case of judges of the Supreme Courts of Justice and also, as in this case, the members of the Constitutional Tribunal” (Statement during the public hearing on March 18, 2013). 106 Redish, Martin H, “Response: Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 136, 2006-2007, p. 148-149 and 156. 107 Statement of expert witness Despouy during the public hearing on March 18, 2013. 108 Ibidem, p. 141. 21