104. In principle, it should not be overlooked that, in this case (related to an arbitrary termination and irregular impeachment proceedings against the victims), the State acknowledged expressly its responsibility with regard to the violation of Article 9 of the Pact of San José in relation to the termination of the victims as members of the Constitutional Tribunal. Indeed, the State indicated that this article had been violated: 135 because there were no grounds established by law for the removal from office of the presumed victims […] although it is true that the National Congress could make a constitutional and legal analysis, this should have included clear mechanisms to submit to review the tenure and the duration of the terms of the former members of the Constitutional Tribunal. The absence of legal certainty concerning the grounds for removing the former members obliges the State to acknowledge its international responsibility in this regard. 105. It is true that it was difficult to understand the scope of the acknowledgement of international responsibility on this point from the State’s declaration. First, in this case, there were grounds for removing the members of the Constitutional Tribunal, on the basis of which impeachment proceedings could be conducted against them. It is also true that the State did not acknowledge any violation related to the impeachment proceedings that were held, because it limited its acquiescence to the facts of the termination resulting from the resolution of the National Congress of November 25, 2004. 106. Nevertheless, I believe that there is a substantial difference between what was decided in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador136 and the instant case, which is the reason I differed from the majority opinion on this aspect. In particular, it should be recalled that, in that case, the ICourtHR considered that the organ that terminated the justices did not have competence; whereas, in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, which prompts this partially dissenting opinion, the litigation was not focused exclusively on the termination of the judges, but also on the alleged violations in relation to the impeachment proceeding, which the National Congress was competent to conduct. In other words, in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Court did not analyze the possible existence of an act that warranted a sanction, because Congress did not have competence to terminate the justices of the Supreme Court, a competence that it did have to impeach the members of the Constitutional Tribunal as analyzed in the Judgment. 107. Indeed, contrary to the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the instant case that inspires this opinion, impeachment proceedings were held against the members of the Constitutional Tribunal who had previously been removed by a congressional resolution. And, in this regard, the ICourtHR based its assessment on the assumption that Congress had competence to conduct these impeachment proceedings. This variable allowed the ICourtHR to determine that, when deciding the sanction, the unstated purpose was related to an “abuse of power.” Thus, the Judgment expressly states:137 Therefore, the apparent legality and justification of these decisions concealed the intention of a parliamentary majority to exercise greater control over the Constitutional Tribunal and to facilitate the termination of the justices of the Supreme Court. The Court has verified that the resolutions of Congress were not adopted based on the exclusive assessment of specific factual information and in order to ensure proper compliance with the laws in force, but sought a very different end related to 135 Para. 14 of the Judgment. 136 Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C, No. 266. 137 Para. 219 of the Judgment. 29