no discussion about the possible analysis of these facts in light of Article 9 of the American Convention, because, according to the case law of the ICourtHR, the principle of legality functions not only in criminal matters, as established in the preceding section. 119. Indeed, according to article 130(9) of the 1998 Constitution, the effect of the adoption of the motion of censure was the immediate removal of the official.158 In this regard, in the session of December 8, 2004, when the vote was held on the motions of censure, it was concluded that “the motion of censure presented ha[d] been adopted.”159 Thus, since two of the motions of censure presented against the judges in the session of December 8, 2004, had been adopted, this entailed their removal, a sanction that added to the termination decision taken previously on November 25, by the resolution of the National Congress. Also, based on what was indicated previously (supra paras. 115 and 116), I must conclude that, owing to its scope, article 130(9) of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution could lead to abusive interpretations by the National Congress, as indeed occurred in this case, because this paragraph contained an extremely general and imprecise definition of the grounds for removal (“The other officials referred to in this paragraph may be impeached for constitutional or statutory offenses, committed in the performance of their functions”). In my opinion, this is clearly incompatible with the legal certainty that the principle of legality of Article 9 of the Convention seeks to ensure in the case of situations resulting from an abuse of power (see below paras. 120 to 137). C) Regarding the concept and scope of the “abuse of power” 120. Analysis of the concept of “abuse of power” — particularly in Spanish legal doctrine – is based on the legal definition: “the exercise of administrative powers for purposes other than those established by law shall constitute abuse of power.”160 Thus, even though they support this concept, García de Enterría and Fernández state that it is not exhaustive, because, in their opinion, it is not necessary that the purpose sought is only specific to the administrative agent. They affirm that “it is sufficient that this purpose, even though public, should be other than the one conceived and established by the norm that grants the power.”161 They state that, “consequently, what is at stake is the administrative legality and not the morality of the official or of the Administration itself. This is precisely why the abuse of power is not limited to the presumptions in which the real purpose sought is an objective specific to the agent, but extends, as stated, to all the cases in which, abstraction made of the conduct of the agent, it is possible to note the existence of a divergence between the purposes really sought and those that, according to the applicable norm, should guide the administrative decision.”162 121. Continuing to develop this position, García de Enterría and Fernández point out the probative problems of their analysis. Indeed, they indicate that “…the main difficulty entailed by the use of the technique of the abuse of power is proving the divergence of purposes that constitutes its essence. It can easily be understood that this evidence may 158 Paras. 73, 171 and 201 of the Judgment. 159 National Congress, record 24-001-IV, session of December 8, 2004 (merits file, tome II, folio 649 and 659). 160 García Enterría, Eduardo and Ramón Fernández, Tomás, Curso de derecho administrativo I, Editorial CIVITAS, Madrid, 1981, third edition, chapter VIII, section IV.1.B, p. 394. 161 Ibidem, p. 394. 162 Ibidem, p. 394. 34