DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ad-hoc PIER PAOLO PASCERI SCARAMUZZA In the case of Perozo et al V. the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela With the permission of the opinion of the majority of my colleagues, I, Pier Paolo Pasceri S., Judge ad-hoc of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights , regret to dissent from the judgment for having a different criterion as to the grounds and the operative paragraphs exposed therein (except for operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the decision) 1 and therefore I am unable to join the decision adopted by the majority of the judges of this Court, whose favorable opinions adopted the judgment on the merits as to the remaining issues that formed part of the decision from which I dissent today. In that sense, I shall now present the grounds in the following way: I do not agree with foregoing judgment since, in my opinion, there are procedural and substantive reasons that must be observed: 1) Procedural reasons: The procedural reasons are related to the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies that was not decided but until the date the judgment was delivered, and was dismissed by the sentencing majority. In my opinion, said objection should have been admitted in light of the claims contained in the application filed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and as a consequence, regarding the petitions contained in the autonomous brief of the alleged victims. 1 The reason for which I do not dissent from these operative paragraphs are the following: a) regarding the decision related to “On the untimeliness in the filing of arguments and evidence contained in the Brief of Pleadings, Motions and Evidence submitted by the alleged victims”, it must be observed that such decision has been considered in the Order of the Court's President of March 18, 2008, and since it was not appealed, the decision became final. In fact, an appeal could have been filed against this decision by virtue of the terms of article 29 (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; but there is no record that such decision has been appealed; therefore, since it is a final decision, it cannot be subjected to a review in the judgment on the merits and insofar as such decision was ratified, I am unable to dissent from it now. In fact, it provides: Article 29. Decisions. 1. The judgments and orders for discontinuance of a case shall be rendered exclusively by the Court. 2. All other orders shall be rendered by the Court if it is sitting and by the President if it is not, unless otherwise provided. Decisions of the President that are not purely procedural may be appealed before the Court. 3. Judgments and orders of the Court may not be contested in any way. b) As to the decision related to”New Arguments and Allegations contained in the Autonomous brief signed by the Alleged victims”, the reason why I agree with this is that I share the grounds expressed in the judgment regarding this issue. In fact, the judgment declares that the alleged victims cannot introduce new facts different from those that are contained in the application presented before the Court. Likewise, according to the judgments, the victims may put forward, on the basis of the facts mentioned by the Commission, new allegedly violated rights or facts that allow explaining, clarifying or disproving the facts mentioned in the application, which, in my opinion, results in the better understanding by the full Court of the matter under question, always limiting to the facts mentioned in the application. c) Regarding the decision on the “prejudice in the roles played by some judges of the Court”, the reason why I agree with the solution provided to this problem was mentioned in the decision that, in that moment, became final. To accept that, on this occasion, that there is a possibility of reanalyzing the decision, would imply to modify or eliminate the effect of a former adjudication that resulted from the Decision of October 18, 2007 made by the judges that, at that time, composed the Court (page 1103 of the records on the merits); which, in light of the terms of article 29 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, may not be contested,