10 basis of a signature that took legal effect as of the time of the challenge, in other words, once the whole petition process on the presidential referendum had concluded. 44. By the account of the State, the process of rescission of contracts of the alleged victims was conducted with strict adherence to the law and respecting the principle of the will of the signatory parties to said contracts. According to the State, on December 31, 2003, the alleged victims signed a new contract with the National Border Council, which went into effect on January 1, until December 31, 2004. The State asserted that on March 12, 2004, the chairman of the National Border Council decided to terminate the contracts of Rocío San Miguel Sosa, Magally Chang Girón and Thais Coromoto Peña under the seventh clause of those contracts, which set forth: “’THE CONTRACTING PARTY’ reserves the right to terminate the instant contract whenever it deems it fitting, after giving notice to ‘THE CONTRACTED PARTY’ served at least one month in advance. ‘THE CONTRACTED PARTY’ will also have the same right to dissolve the contract whenever she sees fit to do so, but she must also give notice to ‘THE CONTRACTING PARTY’ one month in advance.” 45. The State noted that the petitioners alleged that as of March 20, 2004 “the charges of political discrimination began.” However, the way the State understands it, because at that time, the contracts of the alleged victims had already been rescinded, there is no link of cause and effect between their taking part in the petition process and the termination of the contracts. 46. The State claimed that, as a consequence of the termination of the contract, the alleged victims filed on June 22, 2004, for constitutional relief via the amparo proceeding. The judge who heard the case ruled that she did not have jurisdiction and referred the case to the Constitutional Chamber of the TSJ, which declined jurisdiction and sent the case to the Fourth Trial Court. The State asserted that on July 27, 2005, the amparo claim was found groundless on the merits of the matter and noted that the complainants appealed the decision, but on September 9, 2005, the Third Superior Trial Court upheld the original trial court decision. 47. The State contended that the alleged victims filed a complaint before the Office of the People’s Ombudsman on May 27, 2004. It noted that on August 17, 2004, the Office of the People’s Ombudsman issued an official certificate of closure of the proceeding for lack of sufficient evidence to establish that there was a violation of the human rights of the complainants. The State further noted that the alleged victims never went to the CNE to lay out their case so that this agency could determine whether there had been a violation of their political rights. 48. The State claimed that on July 6, 2004, the alleged victims filed a complaint with the Office of the Public Prosecutor, but on January 1, 2005, the Office of the Thirty-Seventh Prosecuting Attorney of the Office of the Public Prosecutor with Full Jurisdiction nationwide moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds that it was not of a criminal nature. Said decision was upheld at the appeals level. The State also noted that the alleged victims filed a direct appeal to the highest court of review (casación), but it was also denied by the Criminal Appeals Chamber of the TSJ, because it was deemed “manifestly groundless.”