9 subjected to surveillance and that, during the hearing held in March 2008, he stated that both he and his family had been threatened. Lastly, the Commission stated that, if the investigation were reactivated, the next of kin could have the justified fear of being the victims of reprisals and, “above all, because the presumed authors of the violations perpetrated are members of the police who have not been brought to justice,” it considered that a situation of extreme gravity and urgency existed that justified granting provisional measures in favor of said next of kin. 16. That, according to the information presented on July 31, 2008, by Mr. Fleury’s new representatives (supra having seen paragraph 29), he had gone into exile in the United States of America, where he now resides. Neither Mr. Fleury nor his representatives, nor the Commission, informed the Court opportunely about the moment when the beneficiary left Haiti. Without detriment to the fact that the State has failed to comply with its obligation to inform the Court about the implementation of the measures ordered (supra eighth and ninth considering paragraphs), the Court finds that, considering that the beneficiary of the measures has left the State that was supposed to protect him, and since no information has been received to indicate that he will return soon or that he wishes to do so, the provisional measures in his favor have become ineffective. 17. That, furthermore, the Court finds that, despite the State’s silence, neither the Commission nor the representatives have duly proved that specific conditions of extreme gravity and urgency exist that would justify an expansion of the provisional measures in favor of the next of kin of Lysias Fleury. In particular, the Commission only repeated the reasons given as factual grounds for requesting the provisional measures in 2002 and, as a new element, merely indicated that Mr. Fleury had stated that he and his family had been threatened and that the possible reactivation of the investigation could entail “a justified fear” for them. Thus, if the situation described could be classified as “of extreme gravity and urgency,” it is not clear why the Commission did not also request the adoption of provisional measures in favor of the next of kin of Mr. Fleury from the start. Moreover, it not clear why the Commission did not advise the Court about these supposed situations as soon as it became aware of them. To the contrary, the Commission forwarded this information only when Mr. Fleury’s new representatives had submitted a request for expansion of the measures, months after he had left Haiti. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Commission has not provided sufficient elements to allow it to consider that a specific situation of extreme gravity and urgency exists that would merit avoiding irreparable damage to these persons by ordering the adoption of provisional measures. Therefore, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in exercise of its authority under Articles 33, 62(1), 63(2), 65 and 68(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 30 of its Statute, and Articles 25 and 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, Decides: 1. That the provisional measures decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its orders of March 18, June 7, and December 2, 2003, in favor of Lysias Fleury, have become ineffective because he has left Haiti, without detriment to whatsoever the InterAmerican Commission may consider pertinent while processing his case.