72 that the tubal ligation was performed to protect I.V.’s life in the hypothesis of a future pregnancy owing to the danger of a possible rupture of the uterus. The physician even stated during the hearing that performing the tubal ligation after the caesarean section could have been one alternative and ratified that, at the time of the caesarean section, I.V. was not in imminent risk of losing her life, but rather the risk would occur if she became pregnant again.304 In this regard, the Court considers that protection from a presumed risk that might or might not occur in the future, could never be considered urgent or a medical emergency in which there was an immediate possibility of risk. Thus, the Court finds that the medical recommendation of a procedure of this nature could have been postponed in order to obtain I.V.’s informed consent. 230. That said, if the Court accepts the version of the facts proposed by the State; that is, that I.V. gave her consent verbally in the operating theater prior to the procedure, it must determine whether this was given in a free, full and informed manner, because as explained above, the mere acceptance of a procedure does not equate affirming that consent was given (supra para. 166). 231. On this point, the Court underscores that I.V. was in an operating theater, with her abdomen open owing to the caesarean section, in a situation of pressure, stress and vulnerability evident in a patient undergoing a surgical procedure. Also, I.V. was very tired, not only because of the duration of the caesarean section that was complicated by the adhesions found (supra para. 64), but also because, before entering the operating theater, several hours had passed between the moment she was admitted to the hospital and when she entered the operating theater. In these circumstances, the Court considers that she was in a situation that would not ensure that her consent was free and full, and this prevented her from giving a valid consent. 232. Additionally, the Court considers that the information provided to I.V. was presented inopportunely at an inappropriate moment, because she was on the operating table after having undergone a caesarean section. The Court finds that, even though the medical personnel provided I.V. with basic information on the Pomeroy-type tubal ligation procedure, the circumstances did not allow this to be complete and adequate, or to cover essential and necessary issues such as the clear explanation of alternative and less invasive contraceptive methods to achieve the objective of preventing a unsafe future pregnancy.305 Consequently, since I.V.’s sterilization constituted a surgical procedure that could have been postponed, the Court considers that the physician should have waited until she had been able to take a fully informed decision in this regard, in different circumstances, after having provided her with more information, particularly about alternative contraceptive methods, and after giving her more time to consider her options. In addition, the Court understands surgical procedure performed on I.V. issued by the Medical Audit Committee of the Women’s Hospital (evidence file, volume VII, annex 1 to the submission of the case, folio 2116), and Statement made by Marco Vladimir Vargas Terrazas on July 28, 2004, according to the record of the oral hearing issued by the Copacabana Trial Court (evidence file, volume XII, annex 1(d)) to the State’s final arguments, folio 4789). Cf. Statement made by Edgar Torrico Ameller before the Inter-American Court during the public hearing held on May 2, 2016. 304 The Court notes that, according to the statements by the doctors, they indicated that they had informed I.V. in the most detailed way possible of the clinical picture found during the caesarean section, the risk in the case of a future pregnancy, and the tubal ligation procedure – that is, its benefits and consequences; they had also explained to the patient that it was a definitive procedure, so that she could not become pregnant again. The Court notes that one of the doctors also indicated that she was given information on other contraceptive methods, while the other doctor did not mention this. Similarly, they indicated in their statements in the domestic sphere, that other methods could not have been used successfully in the case of I.V. because the state of her uterus would not have permitted inserting the copper IUD without causing infections and, as she had just had a baby, she could not be prescribed pills immediately. Cf. Statement made by Edgar Torrico Ameller before the Inter-American Court during the public hearing held on May 2, 2016; Affidavit prepared by Marco Vladimir Vargas Terrazas on April 28, 2016 (evidence file, volume XI, affidavits, folios 3931, 3934 and 3937 to 3938), and Statements made by Edgar Torrico Ameller and Marco Vladimir Vargas Terrazas on July 26 and 28, 2004, respectively, according to the record of the oral hearing issued by the Copacabana Trial Court (evidence file, volume XII, annexes 1(c) and d) to the State’s final arguments, folios 4735 and 4789). 305