77. The representatives argued that the legislation in Argentina, in particular, Article 1071 bis of the Civil Code, has several flaws that contradict the mandate of the American Convention because: a) the broad discretion of the judge to determine when the intrusion into the private life of a person becomes arbitrary and lack of appreciation of the special nature of information that is of the public interest, and b) the absence of clear standards that can be used for determining the amounts to be paid in cases in which a complaint is filed for moral damages in violation of the right to privacy. It was based on that norm that Argentine tribunals rendered judgments against journalists on the grounds that the challenged publications involved an arbitrary interference with the privacy of the former president. The aforementioned article is not, being a norm that allows a restriction, a law in the material sense, because it allows for the broad of the judge in the interpretation of the merits and in the determination of reparations. 78. According to the representatives, the laxness of Article 1071 bis of the Civil Code violates the right to freedom of expression by not providing the judge with a mandate upon which he or she should specifically analyze the existence and implications for the right to freedom of expression at play, by not determining more precisely the prohibited conduct and by allowing the selective and discriminatory application of the norm. The vagueness of the norm generates an affectation to freedom of expression, since an inhibitory effect may originate from the implementation of sanctions that are too high, as well as uncertainty prior to the publication of the scope of the restrictions. In these circumstances, persons should not seek self-censorship in order to not be exposed to legal sanctions. The abovementioned norm is generic and guiding, however, upon placing restrictions on a fundamental right, it requires precision. 79. In relation to the State’s argument, whereby the normative failures are resolved before judicial system, the representatives noted that "excessive vagueness of the law cannot be solved in [this] forum [...], because [there is] no obligation to follow the Supreme Court’s precedents" and the judges of civil courts have a tendency to apply criteria that is more related with reparation of damage than to the protection of freedom of expression. To accept it, "would imply shifting the power of restricting human rights from the legislature to the judiciary," contradicting the standards of the Convention. In addition, the doctrine of actual malice referred to in the jurisprudence being alleged by the State, is not applicable "to cases involving the right to privacy, since in these cases the discussions did not revolve around the publication of erroneous data, but rather on whether information could become public if it refers to [...]the private life of a person." Moreover, the situation is exactly the opposite to that noted by the State, that is, there is no precise legislation on the right to privacy that marks where the protection of that right creates a restriction on the right to freedom of expression. 80. Regarding the absence of standards for the determination of compensatory amounts, the representatives stated that in Argentine law, the standard for establishing the compensatory amount is to weigh the damage and fix an equivalent amount, and since these cases generally involve non-pecuniary damages, justice has the absolute discretion of allocating the amount of compensation. This is evident in the present case since in none of the domestic judgments is there even minimal mention of the standards used to determine the amount of first, one hundred fifty thousand U.S. dollars, and second, sixty thousand U.S. dollars. The judges take on the task of setting amounts as a discretionary action, unrelated to objective parameters. Moreover, in Argentina jurisprudence the standard that governs is that by which all 26