11 fact extended to the accessory fact. 41. On this point, the Commission and the representatives indicated that “the State was trying to reduce the [alleged] harm to the integrity of the members of the Portugal family merely to the initial moment of the disappearance, disregarding that the disappearance [presumably] had numerous effects on the Portugal family that have continued over time.” They added that the alleged violation of the mental and moral integrity of the next of kin is a “direct consequence of not knowing the whereabouts of Heliodoro Portugal until August 22, 2000, and of the [alleged] lack of due diligence of the State authorities […] to conduct an effective investigation.” Consequently, they argued that the Court is competent to rule in this regard. 42. The Court observes that, in its answer to the application, the State acknowledged that “[t]he Court has competence only to examine the effects of Heliodoro Portugal’s forced disappearance that subsisted after May 9, 1990, the date on which […] Panama accepted the Court’s competence, until August 22, 2000, the date on which the human remains buried in June 1971 in the Tocumen Barracks were identified as belonging to Mr. Portugal.” 43. Based on the State’s arguments, and observing the principle of the non-retroactivity of treaties, the Court considers that it is competent to rule on the facts related to the alleged violation of the right to personal integrity of the next of kin of Heliodoro Portugal that occurred after May 9, 1990. In particular, the Court is competent to examine the alleged facts relating to matters such as the presumed existence of close family ties with the alleged victim, the way in which the next of kin were involved in the search for justice, the State’s response to the measures taken by the next of kin, and the uncertainty that the alleged victim’s next of kin allegedly endured as a result of not knowing the whereabouts of Heliodoro Portugal. 44. Consequently, the Court rejects the lack of competence filed by Panama in relation to this point and will proceed to examine the arguments of the parties in this regard when considering the merits of the case. 3. Competence ratione temporis regarding the obligation to define the offenses of forced disappearance and torture 45. The third argument presented by the State is related to the alleged failure to comply with the obligation to define the offenses of forced disappearance of persons and torture. It indicated that this State obligation only arose as of February 28, 1996, and August 28, 1991, when Panama ratified the respective Inter-American Conventions on Forced Disappearance and Torture, 25 and 19 years respectively after the death of Mr. Portugal. It also indicated that the offense of torture has been defined under Panamanian law for more than 25 years, in Article 160 of the 1982 Penal Code, and that Article 432 of the Penal Code adopted in 2007 also defines the offense of torture. 46. On this point, the Commission and the representatives indicated that the State’s obligation “to define as offenses both forced disappearance of persons and torture does not arise only from the ICFDP and the ICPPT [respectively], but from the American Convention itself,” which Panama ratified on June 22, 1978. They also argued that the specific obligations that the State assumed on ratifying the ICFDP on February 28, 1996, and the ICPPT on August 28, 1991, are additional to the general obligation established in Article 2 of the American Convention. Lastly, they indicated that the offense of disappearance of persons was not defined until May 22, 2007. Based on the above, they argued that the Court has temporal competence to rule on the violations that occurred during all the years