13 in the context of the obligation corresponding to the offense of forced disappearance, defined as a continuing and multiple offense (supra para. 29) The Court has also considered that this competence extends to those State acts or omissions relating to the investigation of possible torture, even if this was perpetrated before the Convention against Torture entered into force for the said State, provided that this obligation to investigate remains pending.19 Although there is a dispute between the parties regarding the moment as of which this obligation was pending, for the purpose of examining this preliminary objection, it is sufficient for the Court to find that it is competent to examine possible facts violating Articles 1, 6 and 8 of the Convention against Torture that occurred after September 28, 1991, the date on which the Convention entered into force for the State. 53. Consequently, the Court rejects the objection on competence filed by Panama with regard to this point and will proceed to examine the arguments of the parties in relation to the supposed violation of Articles 1, 6 and 8 of the Convention against Torture when considering the merits of the case. C) Lack of competence of the Court ratione materiae 54. The State affirmed that the Court does not have competence ratione materiae “to examine the alleged failure to comply with the obligation to define the offense of forced disappearance,” because on May 22, 2007, a new Penal Code was adopted, and Article 432 thereof defines this offense and punishes it with 20 to 30 years of imprisonment, the most severe punishment included in the new Code. It also argued that the State’s obligation to define the offense of forced disappearance of persons cannot be required in the context of a contentious case, because the purpose of such a case cannot be to revise domestic laws in abstract, but must examine only human rights violations perpetrated against specific persons. Similarly, it added that the said obligation can be established by the Court only in exercise of its advisory function. 55. The Commission argued that the State failed to comply with the obligation to define the offense of forced disappearance for more than ten years, and that the adoption of the definition of this offense in Panama occurred after the case had been submitted to the Court. According to the Court’s case law, the State’s international responsibility arises at the time of the international unlawful act that is attributed to it. In addition, the definition of the conduct by Panama “was not adapted to the standards established in the Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons for the definition of this offense and the appropriate punishment of those responsible, particularly because the unlawful nature of the conduct is restricted to generalized and systematic situations.” In this regard, the Commission indicated that, “the Court has […] competence ratione materiae to determine the compatibility of the definition of the offense in question with Article III of the Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons. 56. The representatives indicated that the absence of this type of offense in Panamanian law has meant that the criminal proceedings underway for the forced disappearance of Heliodoro Portugal have been conducted under the offense of homicide. “The definition of the offense of homicide disregards the complex nature of forced disappearance, which involves numerous offenses, and leaves some of the conducts that comprise it unpunished.” They also underscored that the failure to comply with the obligation “persists today, because, even though the offense has been included in the recently approved Penal Code, this is not yet in force.” 19 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.), supra note 18, paras. 133 to 136; Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz, supra note 18, para. 18, and Case of Tibi, supra note 18, para. 62.