alleged victims referred to information of public interest. They added that the opening of criminal proceedings due to the publication of information of “evident public interest” was totally contrary to freedom of expression because it harmed that right to the detriment of both the victims and democratic society as a whole. They indicated that this constituted an internationally wrongful act because, according to the Court’s case law, in cases of discourse that was protected owing to its public interest – such as when it referred to the conduct of public officials in the exercise of their functions – pursuant to the Convention, the State’s punitive response by means of criminal law was not appropriate to protect the honor of the official. They also indicated that the measure of subsequent civil liability applied in this case did not meet the requirements of legality, pursuit of a legitimate purpose and suitability, necessity and proportionality. They added that the purpose of the criminal proceedings filed against the journalists was not to obtain a rectification, but rather to silence criticism of the plaintiff’s actions in his capacity as a public official. The representatives also argued that the journalists acted with due diligence when asking the Minister of Public Security to confirm information concerning a public official under his hierarchy and control. Moreover, they indicated that the sentence imposed a duty of maximum diligence – a “sort of special burden of diligence” – on the journalists because it required them to consult a specific and obligatory official source to confirm information. 58. The representatives also considered that, in the instant case, the appropriate way to restore the honor and provide redress to the public official concerned would have been by means of the right of rectification or reply. In addition, they indicated that, by subjecting the alleged victims to criminal proceedings for “libel by the press” based on the provisions of articles 145 of the Criminal Code and 7 of the Printing Act, the State had violated Articles 9 and 2 of the Convention, in relation to Article 13 of this instrument. 59. Lastly, the representatives argued that the State had violated the right to judicial guarantees because the determination that the alleged victims bore civil liability did not comply with the essential minimum standards imposed by the right to be heard in its material scope and, specifically, with the guarantee of a reasoned judgment. They indicated that the Trial Court had considered that the compensation amount established was “proportionate” to the harm caused; however, it failed to include any details of the reasons based on which it had identified the harm and calculated the sum corresponding to civil liability. According to the representatives, the Trial Court merely outlined what it considered “obvious” when determining the compensation amount, without providing any type of justification in this regard; moreover, this was ratified by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Therefore, they concluded that the State had violated Article 8 of the American Convention. 60. The State underscored that this case does not relate to a criminal matter, but is solely civil in nature. It added that the journalists had not duly corroborated the information they published; they failed to consult other sources, such as the Judiciary’s Press Office. According to the State, the publication caused humiliation and discredit to J.C.T.R. among his co-workers and in the community of San Vito de Coto Brus, where he was employed as deputy police chief. It also argued that the erratum published in La Nación two days after J.C.T.R. had filed his complaint and civil action for damages was “almost invisible” and failed to rectify the error committed by the serious accusation made against J.C.T.R. Moreover, “it repeated the harm because it was published in unequal conditions compared to the initial coverage, and due to its location under a humorous item.” According to the State, the right of reply and rectification did not constitute “an essential principle for the control of mass communication”; rather, it 18