information. 76 The European Court of Human Rights has indicated that freedom of expression does not guarantee unlimited protection to journalists, even with regard to matters of public interest. That court has indicated that, even though they are protected by freedom of expression, in the performance of their task, journalists must abide by the principles of responsible and “ethical journalism,” and this is particularly relevant in contemporary society where “not only do they inform, they can also suggest by the way in which they present the information how it is to be assessed.” 77 69. In addition, given the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society and the enhanced responsibility that this entails for professionals employed in the mass media, the State must not only minimize the restrictions to the circulation of information, but must also, insofar as possible, aim at a balanced participation of diverse information in public discussions, encouraging the pluralism of information. 78 Lastly, the Court has indicated that it is essential that journalists who work in the media should enjoy the necessary protection and independence to perform their task effectively because it is they who keep society informed, and this is an indispensable requirement for the latter to enjoy full freedom and to enhance public debate. 79 70. In the context of the protection that States must grant, “privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources.”80 This is a cornerstone of freedom of the press “which enable[s] a society to benefit from investigative journalism, to strengthen good governance and the rule of law.” 81 The confidential nature of journalistic sources is, therefore, essential for the work of journalists and for their role in society as providers of information concerning matters of public interest. 82 b.3 Permitted restrictions to freedom of expression and the application of subsequent liability in cases in which honor and dignity are affected in matters of public interest 71. The Court recalls that, in general, the right to freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship but rather to subsequent liability in very exceptional cases, 83 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177, para. 79, and Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 122. 76 Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 122, referring to ECHR, Stoll v. Switzerland [GS], no. 69698/01, Judgment of December 10, 2007, paras. 103 and 104, and Novaya Gazeta and Borodyanskiy v. Russia, no. 14087/08, Judgment of March 28, 2013, paras. 37 and 42. 77 The Court has indicated that “there must be […] a plurality of means of communication, the barring of all monopolies thereof, in whatever form.” Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra, para. 34, and Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 30, 2019. Series C No. 380, para. 99. 78 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, supra, para. 150, and Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, supra, para. 126. 79 The Court considers that a source is any person who provides information to a journalist. Cf. ECHR, Nagla v. Latvia, no. 73469/10, Judgment of July 16, 2013, and Committee of Ministers of the Councill of Europe, Recommendation No. R(2000) 7 to member states on the right of journalists not to discloses their sources of information. “Definitions.” 80 81 Cf. UNESCO, General Conference, 37 C/61, of November 7, 2013, para. 12. See also, ECHR, Goodwin v. The United Kingdom [GS], no. 17488/90, Judgment of March 27, 1996, para. 39, and Becker v. Norway, no. 21272/12, Judgment of October 5, 2017, para. 65. Cf. IACHR, “Corruption and human rights; inter-American standards,” OEA/Ser.L/V/II., of December 6, 2019, para. 210. 82 83 Cf. mutatis mutandis, Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 120, and Case of Fontevecchia 22