CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE HUMBERTO ANTONIO SIERRA PORTO INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE OF MOYA CHACÓN ET AL. V. COSTA RICA JUDGMENT OF MAY 23, 2022 (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs) 1. With my usual respect for the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court”), the purpose of this opinion is to make some observations on the standards that substantiate the international responsibility of the State of Costa Rica (hereinafter “the State” or “Costa Rica”) for the violation of the right to freedom of expression of Ronald Moya Chacón and Freddy Parrales Chaves. Even though I fully share the content of the third operative paragraph, I would like to underline that, contrary to the most recent decisions on these same matters, 1 on this occasion, the Court examined the conventionality of sanctions that limit the right to freedom of expression in cases of public interest, in light of the principle of proportionality, and reiterated its consistent case law on the legitimate limitations to this right. 2. In the judgment, the Court declared the responsibility of the State considering that the civil sanction imposed on Messrs. Moya Chacón and Parrales Chaves due to the publication in a newspaper of information that turned out to be inexact regarding the existence of a criminal investigation against a police officer for presumed smuggling in the frontier zone, was not necessary or proportionate to the legitimate purpose sought to protect the latter’s honor and, therefore, violated Article 13(1) and 13(2) of the American Convention (para. 93). To reach this conclusión, the Court reiterated its case law standards in this regard; emphasized the role of the right to freedom of expression in a democratic society, the obligation of the State to limit this only in the situations accepted by the Convention, and the special need to protect this right in relation to journalism to avoid punitive measures discouraging or inhibiting the communication of matters of public interest. 3. In addition, the Court was emphatic in affirming that the right to freedom of expression is not absolute. Hence, it explained that Article 13(2) of the Convention sets out the possibility of establishing subsequent liability for the abusive exercise of this right in order to ensure “respect for the rights or reputation of others” (para. 73). In this regard, the Court has considered that civil or criminal sanctions can be used to achieve the harmonious coexistence between these rights. Such sanctions, in particular criminal sanctions, must be conceived as an ultima ratio response to very serious harm to fundamental rights that are closely related to the extent of the harm caused. 4. According to the Court’s case law, the examination of the conventionality of a civil or criminal sanction calls for application of the proportionality test. Thus, in situations in which there are tensions between freedom of expression and other rights, the Court has been consistent in indicating that it is necessary to verify: (i) that the sanction has been previously established by law; (ii) that its imposition responds to an objective established by the Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021. Series C No. 446, and Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 30, 2019. Series C No. 380. 1