American Convention, such as the protection of the rights of others, and (iii) that it is necessary in a democratic society, to which end it must meet the requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality (para. 71). In such situations, the factors surrounding the necessity for, and the proportionality of, the measure are especially important and they include the nature of the expressions (if they are opinions or facts), the person to whom they are addressed, if they are matters of public interest, and whether the sanctions imposed were proportionate to the harm caused. 5. The Court has undertaken this exercise of examining the conventionality of the measures of subsequent liability by an assessment of proportionality in cases such as Palamara Iribarne v. Chile (2005), Kimel v. Argentina (2008), Tristán Donoso v. Panama (2009), Fontevecchia and D`Amico v. Argentina (2011) and Mémoli v. Argentina (2013). However, the flexibility with which this exercise was carried out appears to have been limited in the cases of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela (2019) and Palacio Urrutia v. Ecuador (2021). Indeed, as I indicated in the concurring opinion in the latter case, the position assumed by the Court seemed to move away from its reiterated case law, because it considered that the criminal sanction imposed on a journalist for publishing a criticism of the actions of the then President Rafael Correa, constituted per se a violation of the right to freedom of expression pursuant to Article 13 of the American Convention. In other words, without it being necessary to decide on the proportionality, due to the nature of the communication (public interest). 6. In the instant case, the Court has not following the logic of the last two cases mentioned above which, as I noted in my opinion, created substantiation and application difficulties, 2 and reverted to its line of case law concerning the proportionality test. Nevertheless, I must note that, in this judgment, the Court did not examine the content of the Printing Act that establishes criminal sanctions for the exercise of the profession of journalism in situations that harm the right to honor. However, it is relevant to underline that it acknowledged that statements or communications of public interest have greater protection (para. 74), which does not automatically mean that civil or criminal sanctions are, per se and always, contrary to the Convention. 7. What I wish to emphasize is that, despite involving a case against journalists who published information of public interest, the Court did not ignore the existence of civil or criminal sanctions per se. Regarding the criminal sanction, it indicated that, since it was a type of offense addressed in particular at journalists and established objective liability for editors, directors or owners of the media outlet, it could give rise to a chilling effect. However, since the criminal sanction was not imposed on the applicants, the Court did not make any declaration of responsibility in this regard (para. 82). Regarding the civil sanction, the Court conducted a rigorous test of proportionality and concluded that, despite it being legal, seeking a legitimate purpose and being suitable to achieve that purpose, the measure imposed was not necessary or proportionate, because the diligence of the journalists had been proved, together with the absence of an intention to cause harm, on the one hand, and the negative effects of the sanction on the other (para. 89 ff). 8. I consider that the analysis made by the Court in this decision is more appropriate, by admitting the use of civil or criminal law to address the exercise of freedom of expression in matters of public interest when necessary to protect other rights and to meet the requirements of Article 13(2) of the Convention. The position that civil or criminal sanctions are not per se contrary to the Convention and that a proportionality test should be conducted to identify whether they represent admissible limitations – during which, among other factors, 2 Concurring opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. Para. 11. Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021. Series C No. 446