criminal prosecution will not disappear, because the message threatening freedom of expression has already been sent to Costa Rican society.” The concern expressed has special relevance, as can be noted from the statement made by Mr. Moya Chacón concerning some of the inhibiting consequences of the chilling effect on his own experience, when he described how the mere possibility of similar criminal cases being filed was used as an instrument of pressure and coercion by other police officers in the region in order to prevent not only him, but also other journalists, from publishing articles linking them to alleged irregularities. 38. It should also be stressed that, as this Court’s case law has already added, criminal law cannot be used to sanction any type of rights violation because it is the harshest sanction that the State can impose on an individual. In other words, the availability of criminal offenses cannot disregard the ultima ratio nature of criminal law. In addition, in the case of the protection of conducts related to the exercise of freedom of expression, such as journalistic activities and the dissemination of information of public interest, this exceptionality acquires greater importance. 39. In this regard, I consider that the teachings of Claus Roxin should be highlighted: Criminal law is only the last among all the measures of protection that should be considered; in other words, it can only be used when other social measures to resolve the problem – such as the civil action, judicial or police regulations, or non-criminal sanctions, etc. – have failed. Therefore, the punishment is known as the “ultima ratio of social policy” and its mission is defined as the subsidiary protection of legal rights. [...] This limitation of criminal law arises from the principle of proportionality of our constitutional rule of law: given that criminal law enables the harshest of all State interferences in the individual’s freedom, it may only intervene when it appears that other less harsh measures will not be sufficiently successful. 34 40. More than a reflection on the subsidiary nature of criminal law, the German author reminds us that the modern criminal system should be guided teleologically; therefore, it should ensure the alignment of the assumptions of criminality to the objectives established by criminal policy in the context of the rule of law. 35 Moreover, this evaluative criteria cannot disregard the international commitments assumed by the State, especially as regards human rights. 41. A criminal policy informed by the principles of the American Convention in the sphere of the right to freedom of expression is one which restricts the effects of criminal law on the exercise of journalistic activities to the greatest extent possible. 42. A review of this Court’s case law on freedom of expression, as well as the position taken by other international bodies, reveals that the concern expressed in the judgment in the case of Moya Chacón v. Costa Rica is in keeping with the principles established in international law on the exceptional nature of using criminal law in the case of offenses against honor, especially in the case of journalists or matters of public interest, or when such offenses involve public officials. 43. Having reviewed the Court’s case law on this issue, I will now make an in-depth analysis ROXIN, Claus. Derecho penal: parte general - tomo I. Fundamentos: las estructuras de la teoría del delito. Trad. Diego-Manuel Luzón Peña et al. Madrid: Civitas, 1997, p. 65. 34 35 ROXIN, Claus. Derecho penal: parte general - tomo I. Fundamentos: las estructuras de la teoría del delito. Trad. Diego-Manuel Luzón Peña et al. Madrid: Civitas, 1997, pp. 217-218.