the objective responsibility of States Parties to the Convention: A State [...] may have its international responsibility engaged [...] by the mere approval and promulgation of a law in conflict with its conventional international obligations of protection, or by its failure to harmonize its domestic law in order to ensure faithful compliance with such obligations, or by its failure to adopt the legislation needed to comply with the latter. [...] The tempus commisi delicti is, in my understanding, that of the approval and promulgation of a law which, per se, by its very existence and applicability, impairs protected human rights [...] without the need to wait for the subsequent application of that law generating additional harm. [...] The thesis of objective responsibility correctly emphasizes the element of due diligence by the State, and the control that the latter should exert over all its organs and agents to avoid the violation of the recognized human rights by act or omission. This being so, this is the thesis that, in my opinion, most contributes to ensuring the practical effects of a human rights treaty. [...] 40 52. Subsequently, in its judgment in the case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, 41 the Court’s understanding in this regard suffered a process that the judge referred to as a “giant quantum leap” a “true watershed moment,” 42 in which the Court declared that a provision of the Ecuadorian Criminal Code violated, per se, Article 2 of the Convention, combined with Articles 7(5) and 1(1) of this instrument, irrespective of its application in the specific case. 43 Thus, in 1997, the Court adopted the thesis of the State’s objective international responsibility. 53. Commenting on this evolution – in a separate opinion in the case of “The Last Temptation of Christ (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v. Chile, the judge reflected on the auspicious evolution of the Court’s case law and considered that the decision eliminated any doubt about the possibility that maintaining norms contrary to the Convention in domestic law could result in the State’s international responsibility, affirming that “the attempt to distinguish between the existence and the effective application of a norm of domestic law, for the purpose of determining the configuration or otherwise of the international responsibility of the State, becomes irrelevant.” 44 54. The understanding that, per se, the domestic validity of a law could constitute a violation of human rights has also been supported by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights since 1981 when it heard the case of Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom. 45 On that occasion, the applicant alleged that the existence in Northern Ireland of laws which explicitly penalized and even established imprisonment for certain homosexual acts between consenting adult males – even when they occurred in private – violated his right to respect for his private life, in view of his identification as a homosexual. 46 55. In that case, despite being questioned about his sexual orientation in a police station, Mr. Dudgeon was never prosecuted or convicted for the offenses in question. His complaint was that he had experienced and continued to experience fear, suffering and psychological 40 Ibidem. §22 and 27 (bold added). 41 IACtHR. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Judgment of November 12, 1997. IACtHR. Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v. Chile. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade §13. 42 43 IACtHR. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Judgment of November 12, 1997, §98. IACtHR. Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v. Chile. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade §14. 44 45 ECHR. Case of Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom. Judgment of October 22, 1981. 46 Ibidem. §13.