73. Thus, it is necessary to stress that the domestic courts also have the duty to adapt their interpretative powers to cease adopting any decision that imposes a harsher punishment for offenses against honor merely because these have been committed in exercise of press freedom, regardless of the fact that the laws of the State concerned do not establish that aggravated offense – or at least not expressly. 74. Thus, indicating the elements of the wording of article 7 that could potentially violate human rights is, in my opinion, only one of the steps required to address the issue of criminal measures that result in limiting the exercise of freedom of expression. To this is necessarily added moderation of the possible interpretations established by the domestic courts. 55 b. The inadmissibility of objective liability for the offenses of libel and defamation 75. In light of the second and third sub-categories of article 7 of the Printing Act, criminal liability falls not only on the authors of the content that is eventually considered offensive or defamatory, but also on the editors of the communication medium in which it is published, and can even extend to the directors of the medium and, eventually, to the owners. Thus, the article uses attribution criteria that exceed the parameters established in criminal law to determine the objective criminal liability of diverse individuals, regardless of their specific causal contribution to the allegedly criminal conduct. 76. From this perspective, it is necessary to ponder the violation of the basic principle of criminal law, nullum crimen sine culpa, because the liability of agents is established, not for a wrongful act that could effectively be attributed to them, but merely based on the position they occupy in the media outlet concerned. 77. Similarly, the final part of the article seeks, briefly, to hold the directors of the media outlet liable for the wrongful act in the absence of the name of the responsible editors of the publication. Thus, this is also based on a liability that has no connection to the principle of guilt. Neither the presumption of malice due to a legal fiction nor merely objective criminal liability are admissible under the inter-American system. 78. I emphasize that, on other occasions, although not directly related to offenses against honor, the Inter-American Court has rejected incisively the objective criminal liability of an individual: 298. This Court does not advocate any form of objective criminal responsibility that would be contrary to the contemporary general principles of criminal responsibility and, consequently, pursuant to these universally recognized principles, reaffirms that only the person acting with intent or with imprudence or negligence commits a crime. 56 79. Furthermore, always in relation to the dogmatic analysis of the offense, I discern a construction that would distance itself, a priori, from the principle of strict criminal legality. As established in Article 9 of the Convention, the criminal offense must be expressly described in a precise, exhaustive and prior manner to guarantee the legal security of the individual. 55 It is true that the laws of Costa Rica do not expressly establish an increase in the sanction for offenses against honor when these are committed against a public official. However, it is important to point out that jurisprudential interpretations that assess negatively, in the punitive sense, the fact that the victim of an offense against honor is a public official and, on this basis, increase the corresponding sanction, would also enter into conflict with the principles and precedents established under the inter-American system. 56 IACtHR. Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. Judgment of November 28, 2018, §298.