but rather was the adoption of a de facto sanction. The case should therefore be analyzed in light of the guarantees enshrined in Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. 48. The Commission also emphasized that disciplinary processes pursued against justice operators should be respectful of the principle of judicial independence. The Commission argued that “the right to judicial independence enshrined in Article 8(1) of the Convention is violated” when the job tenure of judges is arbitrarily jeopardized. The Commission thus argued that the State had dismissed Mr. Aguinaga Aillón from his position arbitrarily via a procedure not established in domestic legislation, providing no opportunity whatsoever to be heard or to offer a defense, and through the use of powers not available to the National Congress. The Commission argued that this was a violation of the principle of judicial independence, the principle of freedom from ex post facto laws, and the right of access to a competent authority previously established by law, in the terms of Articles 8(1) and 9 of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, in injury of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. The Commission also concluded that the State had violated Articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(c) of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, in injury of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. 49. The representatives argued that the duties of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal were judicial, as is clear in the 2000 Law on Elections. They held, accordingly, that the members of the TSE were covered by the guarantees derived from judicial independence, including proper appointment processes and judicial irremovability and the guarantee against external pressures. They added that, as the Court has said, there is a direct relationship between the guarantee of judicial stability and irremovability, and the right to remain in public service with equal protection of the right to participate in government under Article 23 of the Convention. The representatives argued, in this specific case, that Mr. Aguinaga Aillón had been dismissed by the action of an institution that was not qualified to do so, using a procedure not established in the domestic legal system, which should thus be considered an arbitrary dismissal that also unduly prejudiced his right to remain in office under conditions of equality and the principle of freedom from ex post facto laws. The representatives therefore concluded that State was responsible for violating Articles 8(1), 9, and 23(1) of the American Convention. 50. They argued that at the time of the facts, there had been only two procedures available to the National Congress for dismissing members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal: (a) impeachment and (b) investigation. Both procedures, following due process, could culminate in the dismissal of members. Neither process had been pursued in Mr. Aguinaga’s case, but instead, the dismissal was immediate, resulting from a resolution adopted by an internal vote in the National Congress. There had been no advance notice, no disciplinary action was taken against him, the alleged victim had not been heard and was thus unable to exercise his right to defense, and no grounds were given for the decision. The representatives concluded that the minimum guarantees set forth in Article 8(2)(b) and (c) of the American Convention had been violated in injury of Mr. Aguinaga. They further clarified the nature of the TSE in their final written arguments, holding that Mr. Aguinaga Aillón should have been granted the same guarantees as judges generally. 51. The State acknowledged its international responsibility for violating Article 8 of the Convention. It argued, however, that under the 1998 Constitution, the TSE was legally an administrative body. For this reason, it explained, the Court’s analysis of the instant case required a detailed analysis of the arguments and consequences on judicial independence in comparison with the cases of The Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador and The Constitutional Court (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador. 16