where the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says, “[e]veryone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.” The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter the ICESCR) says, “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.” 99. The Court has further noted, regarding the content of this right, that labor stability as part of the right to work does not mean permanent, unrestricted job tenure. Instead, it means that this right is to be respected by, among other things, granting worker protection so that cases of dismissal or arbitrary termination occur on justified grounds, such that employers must demonstrate sufficient cause with all due guarantees, and the worker should be able to challenge the decision before domestic authorities who should verify whether the stated grounds are arbitrary or unlawful.112 100. The Court already concluded above that the TSE performed in a judicial capacity in the sphere of elections, and its members, such as Mr. Aguinaga Aillón, therefore enjoyed the same guarantees of judicial independence as judges generally, given the materially judicial nature of their duties (supra para. 59). Judges, when serving in the role of justice operators, must have guarantees of job stability as the most basic condition of the independence they need for their work. The Court concluded in the case at hand that the decision of the National Congress to dismiss Mr. Aguinaga Aillón from his post as a member of the TSE was arbitrary because it was made outside the bounds of congressional power. It did not satisfy the requirements of guaranteeing due process and thus also constituted a violation of the right to job stability as part of the right to work, which pertained to him as an employee of the TSE during his entire term of office. 101. Therefore, the State is responsible for violating the right to job stability enshrined in Article 26 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, in injury of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. 5. Conclusion regarding judicial guarantees, judicial independence, the right to participate in government, and the right to work 102. In view of these points, the Court concludes that the National Congress exceeded its authority when it dismissed Mr. Aguinaga Aillón from his position as a member of the TSE, and thus violated his right to be heard by a competent authority in keeping with the principle of judicial independence. Because his dismissal was arbitrary, it violated his right to hold his position under conditions of equality, and his right to work. Moreover, because the dismissal took place in the context of a mass, arbitrary dismissal of Ecuador’s high courts, the Court reiterates that the State breached the principle of judicial independence and separation of powers. The State therefore violated Articles 8(1), 23(1)(c) and 26 the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, in injury of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. In view of the State’s recognition of responsibility, the Court also concludes that the State violated Articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(c) of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, in injury of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. Cf. Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, supra, para. 150 and Case of Nissen Pessolani v. Paraguay, supra, para. 102. 112 32