106. The Court cautions that the remedy available to Mr. Aguinaga Aillón, by express mandate of the Constitutional Court, would have been an action of unconstitutionality. Under the provisions of the Ecuadorian Constitution in effect at the time, however, such a motion could be lodged either if it had the backing and signatures of 1000 people in the “enjoyment of their political rights,” or if it had received a favorable report of the Ombudsman. Moreover, the cause of such an action was to examine whether a provision or administrative act were consistent with the Constitution, in substance and in style, but it held out no possibility to redress a right that had been breached; this would have been available only under a motion of amparo, which was not available to Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. 107. Because it was impossible to lodge a motion of amparo, Mr. Aguinaga Aillón was prevented from taking any action whatsoever against his dismissal from the TSE. Mr. Aguinaga Aillón told this Court: […] it was impossible for me, for the members of the Constitutional Court, or for the members of the Supreme Court to [take any legal action] because on December 2, 2004, the new Constitutional Court that had replaced the now dismissed Constitutional Court adopted a decision ordering all the judges and courts in the country to deny motions of amparo challenging Resolution R-25-160, and that if they did admit such a motion, they would be breaking an explicit law and would be subject to prosecution, and as a result, the doors to effective judicial protection of our rights and interests were closed.120. 108. The Court finds that, because there was no effective judicial remedy available to protect their rights that had been abridged, and in view of the State’s recognition of responsibility, the State violated Article 25(1) of the Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, in injury of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. 109. The Court also notes that the legal consequences of the impossibility of challenging the ruling, under the terms argued by the Commission, were addressed above in the discussion on Article 25 of the Convention. In view of the State’s recognition of responsibility, the Court concludes that the State is responsible for violating Article 8(2)(h) of Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, in injury of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. VIII REPARATIONS 110. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 63(1) of the American Convention, the Court has held that every violation of an international obligation which results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation, and that this provision reflects a customary norm that constitutes one of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law on State responsibility.121 111. Reparation of harm brought about by the violation of an international obligation means full restitution (restitutio in integrum) whenever possible, which includes the restoration of the prior situation. If this is not possible, as in most cases of human rights violations, the Court will order measures to guarantee the rights that have been violated and to redress the consequences of the violations.122 It has seen the need to award 120 Cf. Statement in public hearing by Mr. Aguinaga Aillón, September 8, 2022, during the 151st session. Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, para. 25, and Case of Nissen Pessolani v. Paraguay, supra, para. 105. 121 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and Costs, supra, paras. 25 and 2, and Case of Nissen Pessolani v. Paraguay, supra, para. 106. 122 34