position. They asked the Court for “fair redress determined in equity” that would reflect the damage to Mr. Aguinaga Aillón’s personal and professional reputation. The representatives submitted a clinical psychological report to back their claims of nonpecuniary damage, stating that the facts of the case had triggered “exclusion and persecution” of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón “in connection with his political, electoral and professional career,” as well as a “[personal] sensation of reputational loss.” 133. The State argued that Mr. Aguinaga Aillón had shown no evidence that his removal from office as a member of the TSE in 2004 had prejudiced his political career. It argued, moreover, that it was unreasonable to blame the State for the curtailment of a political career given that such activities are subject to a multiplicity of factors that are “unstable” and “uncontrollable.” 134. The Court recalls that its case law has clearly stated that damage to a person’s life plan is a separate concept from lost earnings and consequential damages.132 Harm to the life plan relates to the complete realization of the person concerned based on their vocation, aptitudes, circumstances, potential and aspirations that allow them to establish certain reasonable expectations and achieve them.133 This is why the life plan is expressed in terms of expectations for personal, professional, and family development, attainable under normal conditions.134. 135. The Court has also held that damage to life plans entails the loss or serious impairment of opportunities for personal development, in ways that are either impossible or very difficult to repair.135 The Court has also ordered compensation for this type of harm,136 along with other measures. In the case at hand, the argument of damage to Mr. Aguinaga Aillón’s life plan points to an interruption in his professional development as a result of his dismissal from the TSE. The Court finds that the arbitrary dismissal of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón caused impairment to the development of his personal and professional life, and to his state of mind. 136. The Court therefore orders the State to make payment in equity of USD 15,000.00 (fifteen thousand United States dollars) to Mr. Aguinaga Aillón, to be disbursed within one year of the delivery of this judgment, under the terms given in operative paragraph eight hereof. F. Costs and expenses 137. The representatives reported that they had incurred expenditures as they processed the case before the inter-American system. They had made outlays for the public hearing, transmission of documents, office supplies, document duplication, transportation, lodging, food, and honoraria for experts and attorneys. They asked that the amount to cover the costs and expenses of the process be set in equity. The State 132 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 1998, Series C, No. 42, para. 147, and Case of Casa Nina v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2020. Series C, No.419, para. 154. 133 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, supra, para. 147, and Case of Casa Nina v. Peru, supra, para. 154. Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004, Series C, No. 114, para. 245, and Case of Casa Nina v. Peru, supra, para. 154. 134 135 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, supra, para. 150, and Case of Casa Nina v. Peru, supra, para. 154. Cf. Case of the Las Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, supra, and Case of Casa Nina v. Peru, supra, para. 154. 136 39