III. THE WAY TO INTERPRET ARTICLE 26 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION FOR THE DIRECT JUSTICIABILITY OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 33. In addition to the interdependence and indivisibility of rights, explicitly recognized in the Judgment, the implications of which were demonstrated in the preceding section, the direct justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, derives from the American Convention itself, the instrument at the core of the inter-American system that constitutes the main object of “application and interpretation” 66 of the Inter-American Court, which has “competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties” 67 to the Pact of San José. 34. When considering the scope of the right to health, it is necessary to make an interpretative re-evaluation of Article 26 of the American Convention, the only article of this treaty that refers to “the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires,” based on the fact that the Inter-American Court exercises full jurisdiction over all the articles and provisions, which include this provision of the Convention. 35. Furthermore, Article 26 forms part of Part I (State Obligations and Rights Protected) of the American Convention and, therefore, the general obligations of the States established in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention are applicable to it, as recognized by the InterAmerican Court itself in the Case of Acevedo Buendía v. Peru. 68 Nevertheless, there is an apparent interpretative conflict between the scope that should be given to Article 26 of the Pact of San José, and Article 19(6) of the Protocol of San Salvador, which limits the justiciability of the economic, social and cultural rights to certain rights only. A) The apparent conflict between the Pact of San José and the Protocol of San Salvador 36. From my perspective, an interpretative development of Article 26 of the Pact of San José is required in the case law of the Inter-American Court, and this could open new possibilities for making economic, social and cultural rights effective, in both their individual and collective dimensions. Moreover, in the future new content could be established through evolutive interpretations that enhance the interdependent and indivisible nature of human rights. 37. In this regard, I consider opportune the call made some months ago by the very distinguished judge Margarette May Macaulay — from the Inter-American Court’s previous composition — in her concurring opinion in the Case of Furlan and family members v. Argentina, 69 regarding the updating of the normative meaning of this treaty-based precept. The former judge indicated that the Protocol of San Salvador “does not establish any 66 Cf. Article 1 of the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, approved by the OAS General Assembly in October 1979. 67 Cf. Article 33 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 68 Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller”), supra, paras. 16, 17 and 100. 69 Case of Furlan and family members, supra. 13