65. In addition, the obligation to provide reasons translates into the “reasoned justification” that allows the judge to reach a conclusion.52 That guarantee is closely related to the principle of legality, since on the premise that the disciplinary grounds must be established in the State’s legal framework in accordance with the above-described standards, the justification for a ruling should disclose “the facts, reasons and standards on which the authority for the decision was based.”53 In that sense, it is the reasoning in a disciplinary decision that makes it possible to understand how the facts behind the proceedings fit into or fall within the scope of the grounds cited. On this point, in De la Cruz Flores v. Peru the Court underscored the need, with any punitive decision, for there to be a relationship between the behavior with which the person is charged and the provision on which the decision is based.54 66. As regards the applicable penalty, the “principle of maximum severity” implies that the dismissal of a judge is appropriate only in the case of “clearly punishable” conduct “based on the most serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence.”55 The protection of judicial independence requires that the dismissal of judges be considered as the ultima ratio in judicial disciplinary matters. 56 The IACHR has indicated that “under international law, the penalty of suspension or removal must be applied only in the case of the most serious misconduct. As the Council of Europe recommended with respect to disciplinary offences, the disciplinary measure should become stricter as the seriousness of the offence increases, and can include removal of cases from a judge, assigning the judge other tasks, economic sanctions and suspension.” 57 The Court likewise indicated that the guarantee of tenure for justice operators implies that dismissal is due to fairly serious types of conduct, while other sanctions may be used in the case of negligence or incapacity.58 67. In the instant case, the Commission notes, first, that the decision by which the alleged victims were removed from office does not include any reasoning and simply indicates that the motion to remove Carlos Fernández Gadea and Bonifacio Ríos Ávalos for improper performance of their duties was approved by forty-three and forty four votes. This makes it impossible to understand the reasoning behind the decision, including how the alleged victims’ conduct fits the disciplinary fault in question. 68. Moreover, and related to the foregoing, the IACHR underscores that the standard that was cited, “improper performance of their duties,” is extremely vague, leaving a wide margin of discretion to the disciplinary body in charge of enforcing it, and it offers scant guarantees to judges and justices, who are unable to guide their conduct to meet clear and pre-established parameters. That is particularly serious considering that engaging in the prohibited conduct could lead to the serious consequence of removal from office.59 69. The Commission believes that the vagueness of the grounds cited made it possible, at least in part, for the Chamber of Deputies to include in the impeachment charges, as acts that constitute improper performance of duties, a series of jurisdictional decisions issued by the alleged victims, which are related to their judgments or legal opinions and are protected by the principle of judicial independence. In that respect, the IACHR underscores that all the alleged behaviors that constitute the disciplinary fault, with one exception, I/A Court. H.R., Case of Maldonado Ordoñez v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 3, 2016. Series C No. 311, para. 87. 53 IACHR, Report No. 103/13, Case 12.816, Merits Report, Adán Guillermo López Lone et al., Honduras, párr.145. 54 I/A Court. H.R., Case of De La Cruz Flores v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Cost. Judgment of November 18, 2004. Series No. 115, para. 84. 55 I/A Court. H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 259. 56 I/A Court. H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 259; IACHR, Report No. 38/16, Case 12.768, Merits, Omar Francisco Canales Ciliezar, Honduras, August 31, 2016, para. 71 and following. See also Guarantees for the independence of justice operators: Towards strengthening access to justice and the rule of law in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.44, December 5, 2013, para. 211. In that report, the IACHR found that “laws that establish administrative disciplinary measures such as dismissal must be subjected to the strictest test of legality. Such laws not only provide for extremely serious penalties and curtail the exercise of rights, but also create an exception to the principle of judicial stability and can compromise the principles of judicial independence and autonomy.” 57 IACHR, Guarantees for the independence of justice operators: Towards strengthening access to justice and the rule of law in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.44, December 5, 2013, para. 217. 58 I/A Court. H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 199. 59 IACHR. Report No. 43/15, Case 12.632. Merits (Publication). Adriana Beatriz Gallo, Ana María Careaga, and Silvia Maluf de Christin, Argentina, July 28, 2015, para. 250. 52 17