34 120. Second, in the dossier before the Court there is no evidence on the adoption of the Ethics Code (supra para. 88). 121. Third, the Judicial Power currently has a percentage of provisional judges of approximately 40% according to the numbers provided by the State, percentage that at the time of the facts of the present case reached 80% (supra paras. 103 and 104). This, besides generating obstacles to the judicial independence pursuant with paragraph 118 supra, is especially relevant because of the fact that Venezuela does not offer those judges tenure (supra paras. 101, 102, and 113). As previously established, tenure is one of the basic guarantees of judicial independence the State is compelled to offer both titular and provisional judges (supra paras. 75 through 79 and 114). Additionally, the Court observes that provisional judges are appointed discretionally by the State, that is, without the use of public competitive tenders (supra paras. 101, 102, and 113), and many of them have been made titular judges through the PET (supra para. 105). This means that the corresponding positions have been filled without giving the people that are not part of the Judicial Power the opportunity to compete with the provisional judges to access those positions. Despite the fact that suitability evaluations are set in motion through the PET, this procedure grants work stability to those initially appointed with absolute discretion. 122. On the other hand, an immediate reinstatement of Mrs. Reverón Trujillo after the judicial decision that acknowledged the arbitrary nature of her dismissal, and until the competitive tenders were carried out, would have allowed the protection of both the objective sought by the transition regimen as well as the guarantee of tenure inherent to judicial independence. Even more so if one considers that at the time at which the decision of the SPA was issued the Public Competitive Tender had not been held. Likewise, the infringement of the rights of the provisional judge appointed after the dismissal of the victim did not result excessive, since it is reasonable that the dissolving condition of the appointment of the new provisional judge be interpreted as dependent of the validity of the dismissal of the previous one. 123. Therefore, the Tribunal considers that the transition regimen and the provisional natural of Mrs. Reverón Trujillo, conditions put forward by the SPA when it did not order her reinstatement, cannot be considered acceptable reasons. The Court reiterates (supra para. 81) that a necessary corollary of the guarantee of tenure in the position of provisional judges, as well as that of titular judges, is the reinstatement to their position, as well as the reimbursement of the salaries not perceived, when it has been proven, as in the present case, that the dismissal was arbitrary (supra para. 53). In the case of provisional judges, and based on the aforementioned reasons (supra para. 116 and 117) it is understood that the continuance in the position would have been until the dismissing condition occurred, that is, until the celebration of the public competitive tenders. 124. The Court considers that the reasons that could have been put forward for not having reinstated Mrs. Reverón Trujillo would have had to be appropriate to achieve a purpose conventionally acceptable; necessary, that is that there was no other less damaging or proportional means in a strict sense. Examples of justifications that could have been acceptable in this case are: i) that the court or tribunal for which the service was offered no longer exist; ii) that the court or tribunal to which it offered her service be made up by titular judges appointed pursuant with the law, and iii) that the dismissed judge have lost her physical or mental capacity to exercise the position; neither of which were invoked by the SPA in this case. 125. It is important to point out that the State has indicated and provided evidence