18 established by law. […] The judges may only be removed or suspended from their positions through the procedures expressly established in the law.56 67. Now, judges, unlike other public officials, have reinforced guarantees due to the necessary independence of the Judicial Power, which the Court has understood as “essential for the exercise of the judicial function.”57 The Tribunal has said that one of the main objectives of the separation of the public powers is the guarantee of the judges’ independence.58 Said autonomous exercise shall be guaranteed by the State both in its institutional aspect, that is, with regard to the Judicial Power as a system, as well as in connection with its individual aspect, that is, with regard to the specific judge as an individual. The objective of the protection lies in avoiding that the justice system in general and its members specifically be submitted to possible improper restrictions in the exercise of their duties by bodies foreign to the Judicial Power or even by those judges that exercise duties of revision or appeal. 59 Additionally, the State has the duty to guarantee an appearance of independence of the Magistracy that inspires legitimacy and enough confidence not only to the parties, but to all citizens in a democratic society.60 68. The principle of judicial independence constitutes one of the basic pillars of the guarantees of the due process, reason for which it shall be respected in all areas of the proceeding and before all the procedural instances in which decisions are made with regard to the person’s rights. The Court has considered that the principle of judicial independence results necessary for the protection of fundamental rights, reason for which its scope shall be guaranteed even in special situations, such as the state of emergency.61 69. The principle of judicial independence was acknowledged by the SPA itself in its judgment in which it declared the nullity of the dismissal of Mrs. Reverón Trujillo. In that decision, the SPA considered that Articles 254 and 256 of the Venezuelan Constitution, regarding the independence and impartiality of the Judicial Power, 62 “enshrine a general principle of compelling compliance.” 63 Additionally, the SPA stated that from the mentioned articles derives “the principle of independence of the bodies of administration of justice in two fundamental aspects, the respect to their autonomy regarding other bodies of the Public Power, and the duty of the judicial 56 Cfr Article 255 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, published in the Official Gazette No. 5,453 on March 24, 2000 (dossier of annexes to the respondent’s plea, Volume I, annex 1, folio 747). 57 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 171, and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 145. 58 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, para. 73, and Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 55. 59 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 58, para. 55. 60 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra note 57, para. 171. 61 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1), and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 30, and Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25, and 8 of the American Convention of Human Rights), supra note 48, para. 20. 62 Cf. Arts. 254 and 256 of the Constitution, supra note 56, folio 747. 63 Cf. judgment issued by the SPA on October 13, 2004, supra note 45, folio 180.