16 59. The State declared that prior to the imposition of the death sentence, Mr. Martínez Coronado’s criminal trial respected all legal rights and presented no obstacles of any kind to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. With respect to the freedom from ex post facto laws, it noted that under its legislation, the term “dangerousness of the agent” was in effect at the time of Mr. Martínez Coronado’s conviction; thus, the law in effect at the time was applied. B. Considerations of the Court 60. To examine the alleged violation of Manuel Martínez Coronado’s right to life, it is important to recall that the Court has repeatedly established that the right to life plays a fundamental role in the American Convention, as it is a prior condition for the realization of the other rights. States have the obligation to ensure the creation of such conditions as may be required to avoid violations of this inalienable right and, specifically, to prevent attempts against it by the agents of the State. Observing Article 4, in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention, means not only that no one is deprived of their life arbitrarily (a negative obligation), but also that states must adopt all appropriate measures to protect and preserve the right to life (a positive obligation), in accordance with the duty to ensure full and free exercise of the rights of the people within their jurisdiction. 70 For this reason, this article establishes a clearly restrictive framework regarding the death penalty, as can be inferred from a reading of subparagraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (supra footnote 68). Thus, this provision is clearly restrictive and exceptional in its treatment of the imposition and application of the death penalty. 61. As this Court noted in its Advisory Opinion OC-3/83: The subject is governed by a substantive principle laid down in the first paragraph, which proclaims that "every person has the right to have his life respected," and by the procedural principle that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Moreover, in countries which have not abolished the death penalty, it may not be imposed except pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the crime [...]. The fact that these guarantees are envisaged in addition to those stipulated in Articles 8 and 9 clearly indicates that the Convention sought to define narrowly the conditions under which the application of the death penalty would not violate the Convention in those countries that had not abolished it.71 62. From this perspective, Article 4 of the American Convention indicates that in the exceptional cases in which States are allowed to apply the death penalty, this possibility is subject to a set of strict limitations. It establishes that the death penalty can be imposed only for the most serious crimes (Article 4(2)), and it absolutely prohibits its application for political crimes and for related common crimes (Article 4(4)). The fact that the American Convention narrows the scope of possible application of the death penalty to include only the most serious common crimes, not related crimes, reveals its purpose of considering the death penalty applicable only under exceptional conditions. Lastly, concerning the individual convicted, the Convention prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for those who were under age 18 or over age 70 at the time of the crime, and it prohibits its application for pregnant women (Article 4(5)). 63. Also, however, Article 4 is abolitionist with respect to the death penalty. This is reflected in its second subparagraph, which prohibits its application for “crimes to which it does not presently apply,” and according to its third subparagraph, “The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have abolished it.” The intention here is to move toward a final prohibition of this type Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 120, and Case of Omeara Carrascal et al. v. Colombia, supra, para. 175. 71 Cf. Restrictions to the death penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983. Series A No. 3, para. 53. 70