20 132 of the Criminal Code and b) the application against Mr. Martínez Coronado of the punishment established in that provision (the death penalty). 73. Moreover, the representatives also argued with respect to the motion for clemency that it is a violation of Article 4(6) of the Convention, as “the Guatemalan legal system lacks a regulatory mechanism for it.” However, the July 16, 1997, resolution indicates that Guatemala processed and decided on the motion for clemency (supra para. 46), fulfilling its obligation under Article 4(6) in accordance with its international obligations. Accordingly, this Court finds that Article 4(6) of the Convention was not violated in this case. C. Conclusion 74. Therefore, bearing in mind the application of the death penalty as a consequence of the concept of the “future dangerousness” of the agent, this Court finds the State internationally responsible for violating the rights established in Article 9 of the American Convention, in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2, and Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1), to the detriment of Manuel Martínez Coronado. This Court also finds that Article 4(6) of the Convention was not violated in this case. (Article 876 VII.2 RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL of the American Convention on Human Rights, in conjunction with Article 1(1)) A. Arguments of the Commission and the parties 75. The Commission concluded that the joint public defense of Mr. Martínez Coronado and his co-accused constitutes a violation of the right to a fair trial with respect to the provisions of Articles 8(1), 8(2)(c), and 8(2)(e) of the American Convention and of Article 25(1), in conjunction with obligations derived from Article 1(1), to the detriment of Mr. Martínez Coronado. It argued that this joint counsel resulted in inadequate preparation for the technical defense in the criminal trial, with respect to the State’s obligation to provide a quality public defense and the low probative value of the statements of the co-accused, given the inconsistencies among them and the incompatibility of their defenses. Furthermore, it argued that Mr. Martínez Coronado did not have an effective remedy for the violation of his right to defense because domestic decisions did not provide a rationale for departing from the general norm of the incompatibility of joint defense counsel. It argued that the ruling lacked consistent reasoning and even inverted the meaning of Article 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 76. Likewise, the representatives argued that the State violated the right to a fair trial with respect to the provisions of Articles 8(1), 8(2)(c), and 8(2)(e) of the American Convention, in conjunction with obligations derived from Article 1(1), to the detriment of Mr. Martínez Coronado. They noted that Mr. Martínez Coronado’s right to defense was violated by sharing defense counsel Article 8. Fair Trial. “1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature. 2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: [...] c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense; [...] e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law.” 76