26 aims of the sub judice case, resorting, whenever necessary, to the statements of the parties and to other elements evidenced in the proceeding and which allow it to decide that there has been a confession of facts, an acquiescence to claims, or both, either comprehensively or in part. It is desirable, though not indispensable inasmuch as the Court can conduct its own examination of matters and decide accordingly-, for those who acquiesce to precisely state what facts they confess and what claims they accept, both in light of the application filed by the Inter-American Commission and regarding the claims mentioned by the victims and their next of kin, under the terms of Articles 36(1) and 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 11. In the instant case, the State of Guatemala withdrew the preliminary objections that it had raised at the outset and it acknowledged its international responsibility. When he explained this act, the agent of the State pointed out that the acknowledgment did not entail any judgment regarding individual criminal liabilities, subject to their own sphere of cognizance. This refers to what I have called the “duty of criminal justice” (see, for example, my article “Las reparaciones en el sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos”, in El sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanas en el umbral del siglo XXI. Memoria del Seminario (November, 1999), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 2001, v. I, pp. 154-156), which the Inter-American Court examines when it rules on reparations, a matter not addressed in the April 29 judgment. This once again enables observation of the nature of the judgments of the Court, traditionally differentiated and recently unified: on the one hand, they involve a ruling on the violation committed, if that were the case; on the other hand, they condemn certain actions, omissions or entitlements, if this were appropriate. 12. Taking into account the written and verbal expressions of the State, the Court has deemed it pertinent to issue rulings on the subject matter and on the development of the process. Its April 23, 2004 Order and the April 29 Judgment itself sought to do this. The former deemed the preliminary objections to be withdrawn and admitted the acknowledgment of international responsibility; the latter, to which I add this Opinion, stated that “the controversy regarding the facts that gave rise to the instant case has ceased” (operative paragraph 1, partly based on the statement made by the State, the nature of which constituted a confession) and that the State “breached the rights set forth” in various Articles of the American Convention (operative paragraph 2, partly based on the statement that, also in accordance with its nature, constituted an acquiescence). 13. As I have said above (supra sub 4), the Court could have ordered continuation of the proceeding regarding the facts and the violations that they entail, exercising an authority granted to it by Article 55 of the Rules of Procedure, but after analyzing the evidence regarding both matters (an authority that, I insist, it does not immediately decline due to an act by a party) it deemed that in the case in point the elements for the judicial decision reached were at hand. 14. It could be said that once the confession and the acquiescence had occurred – both of them under the title of acknowledgment of international responsibility- the dispute regarding the merits (facts in violation of rights protected by the Convention) had ceased, and that therefore it was not necessary to receive and weigh evidence (for example, testimony and expert opinions) nor to mention them in the judgment. I do not share this view. It was pertinent to hear the testimony and expert opinions previously offered to and admitted by the Court, which would encompass the reparations that were the new subject matter of the hearing, originally ordered to