34 decision issued by a lower court could either set the case for trial or dismiss the case.104 In the instant case, the Sixth Chamber changed the classification of the crime according to a different interpretation of the facts and stated the grounds supporting its decision, in accordance with the powers vested in it (supra para. 84). 102. Expert witness Ernesto Albán-Gómez expressed that, according to criminal proceedings in force in Ecuador at the time of the events in the instant case, after the preliminary proceedings there was an intermediate stage in which the judge decided whether to set the case for trial or to dismiss it. This stage concluded when the case was either set for trial or dismissed (supra para 28(b)). 103. This Court considers that the Sixth Chamber observed the provisions established in the Code of Criminal Proceedings in force at the time of the events. It changed the crime classification and put an end to the proceedings conducted against Dr. Montenegro-López by an order of final dismissal based on the statute of limitations, which had the effects of res judicata,105 pursuant to the procedural rules in force. 104. Therefore, the Court considers that the allegations made by the Commission and the representatives in relation to the crime classification’s change and lack of access to an appropriate remedy shall not proceed in this case, since it has not been proven that the State has incurred in any arbitrary action, nor that it has violated the principle of due process, nor that it has prevented Laura Albán’s next of kin’s access to justice. 105. As for the situation of Dr. Fabián Espinoza-Cuesta, who is a fugitive, State authorities have not taken the necessary actions aimed at locating him in a timely manner and arresting him. The State acknowledged so before the Court (supra, paras. 10, 16 and 17). 106. In the light of the aforementioned facts (supra, paras. 79 to 84) and considering the partial acknowledgment of responsibility by the State (supra, paras. 10, 16 and 17), this Court notes that on December 13, 1999, the Sixth Chamber issued an order setting the case against Dr. Fabián Espinoza-Cuesta for trial. Under domestic laws, authorities had the duty to have him appear before the court given that the trial had been suspended until the accused was apprehended or voluntarily appeared before the court. The State had the obligation to carry out all the necessary and appropriate actions to try to locate and arrest the accused, including through extradition proceedings. 107. After the aforementioned order of December 13, 1999, there is only evidence that on August 17, 2000 the Fifth Judge sent an official letter to the Chief of the Pichincha Judicial Police in order to pursue with the localization and apprehension of Dr. Fabián Espinoza-Cuesta; on January 4, 2001, the Fifth Court requested 104 Article 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure established that “[i]f on appeal the High Court considers that the case should be set for trial rather than dismissed, the Court shall issue an order setting the case for trial under Article 253. If, on the contrary, the High Court considers that an appealed order to set the case for trial is not pertinent, it shall reverse it and order the dismissal of the case.” 105 In that sense, Article 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure established that “[t]he final dismissal of a case puts an end to the proceedings and, consequently, bars any further prosecution of the same event.”