525. The Court also notes that, in response to the situation of real and imminent danger faced by the justices of the Supreme Court, the councilors of state and the other employees of, and visitors to, the Palace of Justice, the State should have adopted the pertinent measures for their protection, which could never have depended merely on the wishes of the President of the Supreme Court, even if that “order” had been given, which, the Court reiterates, has not been proved. The State’s argument that the surveillance was withdrawn because it had merely been provided for the visit of the French President, which occurred on October 17, warrant similar considerations. The situation of danger for the Palace of Justice and its occupants was not related to that visit, but to the functions of the high courts, and the decisions they were examining. The State was aware of the threats that several justices and councilors had received, as well as the plans of the M-19 to take the Palace of Justice (supra para. 523). Thus, the Court emphasizes the considerations of the Council of State in numerous decisions related to the instant case, in which it has asserted that “[t]o affirm that ‘the danger of the attack was on the 17th’ and that, nevertheless, ‘the Service was provided until the 21st’ as an example of efficiency in compliance with the State’s obligation […], is an explanation that combines ingenuity and cynicism.” 825 526. The Court recalls that State authorities who become aware of a special situation of risk must find out or assess whether the person or persons threatened or harassed require measures of protection, or else refer the matter to the competent authority in that regard, as well as offering the person at risk prompt information on the measures available. The assessment of whether a person requires measures of protection and the most appropriate measures is an obligation that corresponds to the State. 826 The Court also notes that the assessment that the risk has ceased, so that it is no longer necessary to continue the measures adopted, requires a careful analysis of the reasons that led to and justified their adoption, as well as the circumstances at the time their conclusion and lifting are evaluated. Given the significance of the threats against the justices and occupants of the Palace of Justice, the presumed decision that the risk had ceased required greater care and diligence before the enhanced security arrangements were withdrawn. 527. In addition, with regard to the State’s argument that the taking of the Palace of Justice would have occurred even if the surveillance had not been withdrawn, the Court recalls that the obligation to prevent human rights obligations is an obligation of means and not of results (supra para. 519). Consequently, regardless of whether the attack would have occurred, even with the surveillance that was withdrawn, the State’s failure to adopt the measures that should reasonably have been taken in view of the danger that had been verified constituted non-compliance with its obligation of prevention. The Court recalls that one person requested this. [He did not do] this, orally or in writing, and [he] venture[d] to say that neither had Justice Alfonso Reyes Echandía given this order. No other justice or councilor had the authority to do this.” Extract from the testimony of Carlos Betancur Jaramillo in the Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folio 30491) 824 Cf. Judgment of the Contentious-Administrative Chamber of the Council of State of July 24, 1997, in the proceedings instituted by Cecilia Cabrera and another (evidence file, folios 527 and 528); Judgment of the Contentious-Administrative Chamber of the Council of State of July 31, 1997, in the proceedings instituted by Elvira Forero de Esguerra and another (evidence file, folios 2847 and 2848); Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folio 30493), and Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folio 105). 825 Cf. Judgment of the Contentious-Administrative Chamber of the Council of State, in the proceedings instituted by Cecilia Cabrera and another, of July 24, 1997 (evidence file, folios 53 6 to 537); Judgment of the ContentiousAdministrative Chamber of the Council of State, in the proceedings instituted by Luz Dary Samper Bedoya, of September 25, 1997 (evidence file, folios 3134 and 3135). See also, the judgment of the Administrative Court of Cundinamarca, in the proceedings instituted by María Terse and another, of December 12, 2007 (evidence file, folio 1173). 826 Cf. Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 248, para. 201, and Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, para. 127. 187