rights violations should not be heard by the military criminal jurisdiction, and on the exceptional and special nature of the military criminal justice system. 692 447. Moreover, with regard to the State’s argument that the partiality, or lack of independence, of the proceedings under the military jurisdiction has not been proved, the Court emphasizes the opinion of expert witness Federico Andreu Guzmán that, in 1985, “the military criminal jurisdiction was totally [incorporated …] into the hierarchical chain of command of the Armed Forces.” In this regard, he explained that, owing to “the extremely hierarchical structure of the Armed Forces, an institution based on the principles of loyalty and subordination, active-duty officers lack the necessary independence and impartiality to try cases of members of the same institution implicated in human rights violations against civilians. Thus, it is considered that active-duty officers are neither independent nor able to deliver impartial judgments against members of the same Armed Forces.” 693 In this regard, the Court recalls its consistent case law in which it has indicated that the military jurisdiction does not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality established in the Convention. 694 448. In addition, as regards the State’s argument that, at the present time, the investigations are being conducted by the ordinary system of justice, the Court notes that, in this case, the intervention of the military criminal jurisdiction in the investigation of the forced disappearance of Irma Franco Pineda and the torture of Yolanda Santodomingo Albericci and Eduardo Matson Ospino had specific consequences on the subsequent investigation by the ordinary justice system. In particular, the discontinuance of the proceedings for the forced disappearance of Irma Franco Pineda in the military criminal jurisdiction, where members of her family were not allowed to participate as a civil party (supra para. 164), 695 has prevented the prosecution of the Colonel, Head of the B-2, in the 692 Inter-American Commission, see, inter alia: Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1992-1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, Doc. 14, Chapter V, of March 12, 1993; Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85, Doc. 8 rev., Chapter V, of February 11, 1994; Second Report on the situation of human rights in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.84, Doc. 39 rev, of October 14, 1993; Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Observations and recommendations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt, CCPR/C/79/Add.23, of 9 August 1993, para. 9; Observations and recommendations of the Human Rights Committee: Morocco, A/47/40, of 23 October 1991, para. 57; Colombia, CCPR/C/79/Add.2, of 25 September 1992, paras. 5 and 6, where it indicates that “[m]ilitary courts do not seem to be the most appropriate ones for the protection of citizens’ rights in a context where the military itself has violated such rights,” hence it recommended that the State “limit the competence of the military courts to internal issues of discipline and similar matters so that violations of citizens’ rights will fall under the competence of ordinary courts of law”; Venezuela, CCPR/C/79/Add.13, of 28 December 1992, paras. 7 and 10; Croatia, CCPR/C/79/Add.15 - A/48/40 of December 28, 1992, para. 362; United Nations, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/39/121, Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile, 14 December 1984, para. 3; Resolution A/RES/40/145, Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile, 13 December 1985, para. 2; Resolution A/RES/41/161, Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile, 4 December 1986, paras. 7 and 9 (h); Resolution A/RES/42/147, Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile, 7 December 1987, para. 8; the former Commission on Human Rights: Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1989/32 on the Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and the independence of lawyers of March 6, 1989, and also the Draft declaration on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and the independence of lawyers, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/20/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1, prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Mr. L.M Singhvi, establishes in paragraph 5(f) that “[t]he jurisdiction of military tribunals shall be confined to military offences.” 693 Cf. Written summary of the expert opinion of Federico Andreu Guzmán (evidence file, folios 36371 and 36411). This explanation was made citing the Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers on his visit to Colombia in 1997. E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.2, 30 March 1998, paras. 173 and 174. 694 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 132, and Case of Osorio Rivera and family members v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2013. Series C No. 274, para. 191. 695 The Court underscores that when military courts examine acts that constitute the violation of the human rights of civilians, they exercise jurisdiction not only in relation to the accused, who of necessity must be a member of the military in active service, but also in relation to the civilian victim, who has a right to participate in the criminal 157