522. Despite these judicial and extrajudicial decisions, the State has contested the facts on which the alleged violation of the obligation of prevention is founded, indicating that: (i) the increase in security in the center of Bogota at the end of October 1985 was due mainly to the visit of the President of France on October 17, 1985; (ii) the surveillance was withdrawn at the request of the President of the Supreme Court of Justice at the time; (iii) the security was not withdrawn deliberately to allow the M-19 guerrilla group to enter the Palace of Justice, and (iv) the presence or absence of this surveillance made no difference to the taking of the Palace, because the scale of the armed attack planned by the M-19 could never have been anticipated. Owing to this dispute, the Court will now examine the violation of the obligation of prevention alleged by the representatives. 523. In this regard, the Court recalls that to prove that the State has failed to comply with its positive obligation to prevent human rights violations, it is necessary to verify that: (i) at the time of the facts there was a situation of real and imminent danger for the life of a specific individual or group of individuals; (ii) the authorities knew or should have known, and (iii) they failed to adopt the reasonable and necessary measures to prevent or avoid this danger (supra para. 520). Regarding the risk to the Palace of Justice and its occupants, the following has been proved in this case: • Starting in mid-1985, justices of the Supreme Court and of the Council of State had been receiving death threats (supra paras. 90 and 91). Several justices of the Supreme Court received “death threats, that extended to their families” in order “to coerce [or] intimidate the justices to make them change their opinions and their votes” in relation to the non-enforceability of the extradition treaty between Colombia and the United States. 808 Meanwhile, the threats against the councilors of state were related to rulings declaring human rights violations. 809 • The pertinent authorities were aware of these threats, as well as the related risk factors; consequently, “the National Police increased personal security plans and, in general, […] organized the protection of the Court premises.” 810 • Starting in August 1985, radiograms were addressed to the Brigade’s Tactical Units, to the National Police, and to the DAS indicating that “a terrorist act with national resonance” or “actions with national and international impact” would take place in Bogota, or a “terrorist act against the Palace of Justice” and that “the intention was to take the building of the Supreme Court of Justice.” 811 • On September 30, 1985, the National Security Council held a meeting 812 at which the DAS presented a report in which it analyzed the background information, the most significant facts, and the credibility of the threats, and also submitted conclusions and recommendations. Also, as a result of this meeting, the Ministry of Justice sent a letter to the President of the Supreme Court informing him of the 808 The Special Investigative Court placed on record that the competent authorities (DIJIN and DAS) had been advised of the threats. Cf. Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folios 30483 and 30484), and Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folios 95 to 98). 809 Cf. Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folios 98 and 99), and Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folio 30484). See also: Note of the DAS of September 30, 1985, regarding the threats made against judiciary officials (evidence file, folios 31784 to 31792). 810 Affidavit made on November 8, 2013, by Oscar Naranjo Trujillo (evidence file, folio 35931); Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folio 30484), and Report of the Truth Commission (evidence file, folio 100). 811 Report of the AZ (merits file, folios 3471 to 3477). 812 This meeting was attended, among others, by several ministers, the Director General of the Police, the Head of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), the Head of Colombian Civil Defense, the Special Attorney assigned to the Military Forces, the Director of the Investigation and Judicial Police, and a representative of the Head of Department 2 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cf. Report of the Special Investigative Court (evidence file, folio 30484). 184