52 subject to procedures of the general jurisdiction;” and this Supreme Court decision was based on the notion of “consequences of the trial,” which the Military Code does not name as a causal factor for blocking the statute of limitations. They added that the Supreme Court decision resulted from a time-barred appeal by the prosecutor of the National Appeals Chamber. 199. They argued further that “the change in the proceedings occurred only with regard to the use of the statute of limitations, because if the provisions of the general criminal jurisdiction had been applied, the petitioners should have been released immediately. […] [The decision] order[ed] that the provisions of the criminal code should apply, even though the text itself recognized the existence of an apparent conflict between the two bodies of law and the unmistakable federal character of the Code of Military Justice, which by virtue of the principle of specialization should have required the application of the military code instead of the provisions of the criminal code.” 200. They therefore stated that when the process reverted to the provisions of the Code of Military Justice, the result was harsher sentencing. They held that the Constitution and the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica were higher-level instruments that limited the scope of article 67 of the Criminal Code.195 The same argument was offered by Mr. Candurra’s defense team during the hearing held under article 445 bis of the Code of Military Justice, with no response. They also held that part of the reason the concept of “consequences of the trial” was not applicable was the fact that the events that blocked the advance of the statute of limitations had not taken place within reasonable periods or without undue delay. 201. The State said that the arguments by the applicants addressed certain components of article 8(1) of the Convention, but “[h]ave no bearing, in this order of ideas, on the provisions of article 9 of the Convention.” 202. The State added that the important consideration for examining article 9 was that “the three bodies of law that were applied, that is, the former [Code of Military Justice], the sincerescinded Criminal Procedural Code, the still-current Criminal Code and the current Criminal Procedural Code of Argentina were the type of prior laws applicable to the case[.] The decision by the Supreme Court to apply the Criminal Code’s rules on the statute of limitations – which furthermore had been correctly applied by the highest court in Argentina because article 510 of the [Code of Military Justice] referred back to the provisions of Book I of the general substantive criminal laws – could not in any sense be considered as the application by the State of Argentina of criminal laws enacted subsequent to the facts.” 203. The State clarified that the two legal systems were interconnected by article 510 of the Code of Military Justice, which read: “(a) the provisions of Book I of the Criminal Code shall be applicable to military crimes to the degree that the nature of such crimes so allows, and are not contrary to the statutes of limitations stipulated herein.” 195 Criminal Code (Law 11.179, December 21, 1984): Article 67.- The period for the statute of limitations is suspended in the case of crimes whose prosecution would require decisions on preliminary or pretrial questions that need to be settled in a separate process. Once the cause for suspension of the statute has been settled, the limitation period resumes. The period can also be suspended for crimes committed in the exercise of public duties for all those who participated, so long as any of them continues to hold public office. […] The period for the statute of limitations can be suspended only for: (a) commission of another crime; (b) the person receives a first summons as part of a trial to deliver an initial formal statement for the crime under investigation; (c) formal presentation of charging documents to open the case or take it to trial, according to the provisions of applicable procedural legislation; (d) the order summoning to trial or an equivalent procedural act; and (e) the handing down of a conviction, even if it is still subject to appeal. […] (evidence file, folio 12682).