58 226. The second limit on any restriction is related to the purpose of the restrictive measure; in other words, that the cause invoked to justify the restriction should be among those permitted by the American Convention and established in specific provisions included in certain rights (for example, to protect public order or public health, in Articles 12(3), 13(2)(b), and 15, among others), or in the norms that establish the legitimate general purposes (for example, “the rights and freedoms of others,” or “the just demands of the general welfare in a democratic society,” both in Article 32).209 The secondary legal effect of permanent disqualification in this case specifically points to one of the assumptions by which the State may “regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities” protected by article 23(1), to wit, “sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.” 227. The next question is whether a measure, even if it is lawful and serves a purpose allowable under the Convention, is necessary and proportional.210 The Court will examine the restrictive measure under consideration in light of this requirement and must determine whether it: (a) serves a pressing social need, that is, whether it is intended to respond to an overriding public interest; (b) is the option that least restricts the protected right, and (c) narrowly serves to achieve the legitimate objective. 228. The sentence of permanent disqualification was ordered by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (supra par. 81) and later upheld by the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation (supra par. 94), whose judgment will be taken as final and unappealable for the purposes of this analysis. 229. An examination of the nature and length of the sentence of disqualification under articles 19 and 20-ter of the Argentine Criminal Code, as well as the arguments presented by the State in the instant case, shows that the sanction is a block on labor rights (disbarment from public jobs and positions), electoral rights (removal of the right to vote and be elected) and pension rights (suspension of the enjoyment of retirement or pension benefits). The duration of the measure is not eternal or perpetual, but rather is conditional upon the restitution of damages “to the extent possible” and a 10-year term. 230. The Court sustains, based on these considerations, that the measure was invoked to settle a criminal conviction associated with the commission of financial crimes against the Argentine Air Force and served the purpose of protecting the public treasury by preventing a person convicted of crimes of fraud and forgery from gaining access to public position and taking part in elections for a specific period of time. Another tenet is to place the least possible restriction on the protected right – in this case, the political rights of the accused – and in the view of the Court, the measure was not permanent, but limited to the term set by law. Finally, the Court sustains that, given the particular features of the instant case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to hold that the measure, including the time it had already been effect, was unfit to serve the legitimate purpose of safeguarding the public interest when it limited electoral participation by the accused for a predetermined period. 231. The Court therefore judges that the application of the 10-year secondary legal effects, known as “full and permanent disqualification” ordered for Mr. Candurra, Mr. Pontecorvo, Mr. Di Rosa, Mr. Arancibia and Mr. Machin, conform to the provisions of article 23(2) of the Convention, which allows the State to regulate the exercise of political rights based on a commissions; 4. suspension of access to all retirement, pensions or benefits, whether civilian or military, the amount of which shall be credited to family members holding pension rights. 209 Cfr. Case of Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, par. 180. 210 Cfr. Case of Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, par. 184.