67 for Mr. Aracena, USD 1,246,278.00; for Mr. Mercau, USD 1,123,156.90; for Mr. Morón, USD 1,217,451.20; for Mr. Argüelles, USD 1,238,697.80; for Mr. Cardozo, USD 1,169,737.94; for Mr. López, USD 660,585.50; for Mr. Allende, USD 660,585.50; for Mr. Marcial, USD 1,098,043.94 and for Mr. Muñoz, USD 1,094,805.00. 277. The State, in turn, denied the existence of the facts on which the representatives based their claims for compensation, arguing that they had been neither proven nor verified. Among other things, they denied that the applicants should be indemnified for pecuniary damage, lost earnings and retained wages, that the applicants and their families had experienced nonpecuniary harm or alleged damage to their life plans, and that the case law cited by the applicants was applicable for this purpose. The State therefore disputed the legal basis for the claims of redress for each and every one of the items contained in the petitions by the applicants. 278. They stated that if the Court should order some measure of redress holding the State responsible for the facts in the case, “these measures should not include the consequences of the precautionary measure of pretrial detention, which ought to be claimed in the domestic jurisdiction, but instead should be limited to […] the question of military due process.” 279. They further argued that the applicants themselves should be the only beneficiaries of the proposed measures of redress, and not their families, as the Commission had recommended in its Report on Merits. 280. The State also made reference to the claims concerning pretrial detention, noting that the jurisprudence of Argentine courts had recognized the right to redress for prisoners for the time they remained in pretrial detention if followed by acquittal. It argued that the claims for compensation, both for this item and under the other headings, lacked any legal grounds in this international setting because no such claims had been undertaken in the domestic courts. 281. With respect to pecuniary damage, the State held that the petitions by the representatives were out of order because they lacked objective guidelines for legal and mathematical calculation, but were “simple estimates […] for which no particular data have been offered and no documentary backing adduced, and they are based merely on military wages received in due time by the applicants.” It deemed the amounts being requested as “exorbitant,” and stressed that there was no causal nexus between the alleged damage caused and the amounts of compensation, or any parameters to calculate these amounts. 282. The State also made reference to the idea of lost potential job prospects, explaining that such loss could be recognized only when the normal path of professional life or other endeavors is interrupted by actions or events extrinsic to the person, which was not the case here because it was the behavior of the applicants themselves that had led to their arrest and subsequent legal processes; by “committing serious crimes, they permanently interrupted their expectations for advancement in their military careers, or of aspiring to higher military ranks available in each area of specialization.” They added that the representatives had not provided sufficient evidence to determine the probability of these conjectured damages. 283. The State then discussed the matter of lost earnings and lost wages, arguing that this claim was out of order, first, because during the time of pretrial detention, the applicants had continued to receive the legally-required 50% of their wages, and therefore could not petition for that period; and second, as of the time of the convictions, sentencing and subsequent discharge, the applicants were no longer entitled to receive military wages. The State pointed out that the loss of military wages and the lost earnings were a consequence of the applicants’ conviction for criminal offense when they were found guilty of the crime of military fraud.