him in the police vehicle. Furthermore, in none of the statements did the officers state “the reason why they had detained [Mr. Aroca Palma] in the first place.” In fact, no official report on the arrest was issued, nor was it called in over the police radio communication system. 64. The Commission pointed out that no information had been provided regarding the existence of internal regulations authorizing officers to detain suspects for identification purposes or to conduct searches on the grounds of reasonable suspicion, although the State had not alleged that regulations of that kind existed in any case. Neither was it alleged that legislation existed requiring the police to explain, in writing and to their superiors, the reasons why they would have made an arrest without a warrant, or if it was because the alleged victim had been caught red-handed. Therefore, the detention of the alleged victim was unlawful and arbitrary, in violation of Articles 7(1), 7(2), and 7(3) of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof. 65. The Commission added that the State had not presented information confirming the fact that the police officers had told Mr. Aroca Palma why he was being detained. Nor did the individuals who were with the alleged victim at the time of his detention hear the police give any such explanations. It is also evident that the purpose of the detention was not to present the alleged victim to the competent authority so they could determine the legality of the arrest and protect his personal safety. Therefore, the State was responsible for the violation of Articles 7(4) and 7(5) of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof. 66. The representative argued that the State’s responsibility had been fully demonstrated, as confirmed by the Law for the Reparation of Victims, whose Article 2 establishes that the State “recognizes that the victims suffered unjustifiable violations of their life, liberty, integrity and dignity.” 56 67. The State maintained that, at the time of the events, it had “legal mechanisms […] to guarantee and ensure the protection of the right to personal liberty,” including Article 23 of the 1998 Constitution and the provisions contained in Article 24, which “concretely recognized the procedural requirements that public agents must follow when depriving someone of their liberty.” The Constitution also recognized the right to a writ of habeas corpus in the event of a violation of the right to personal liberty. Furthermore, the Penal Code in effect at the time “punished all unlawful and arbitrary arrests.” 68. The State also argued that the current provisions of the Constitution and ordinary law maintained and reinforced the guarantees and protection mechanisms relating to the right to personal liberty. It added that, from the date on which the events occurred to the present time, Ecuador “has maintained an institutional structure that protects the right to personal liberty of all persons under its jurisdiction,” and “has shown that it has taken progressive [...] legal steps to broaden and complement this right with other procedural and jurisdictional guarantees.” A.2. Right to life 69. The Commission argued that it was an undisputed fact that Joffre Aroca died on February 27, 2001 as a result of the shot fired by a second lieutenant of the National Police, who was on duty. It pointed out that the police officer in question had been convicted of the crime, and his version of events had been discounted (he alleged that the victim had run away, and that the shot fired was the result of a struggle between the two). 70. It maintained that while the State had a responsibility to provide a satisfactory account of what happened, it had failed to offer any explanation of how the death of the alleged victim 56 Argument put forward in the final written arguments. 15