San Salvador.86 Indeed, the latter instrument stipulates that “any instance in which the rights established in paragraph (a) of Article 8 and in Article 13 [of the Protocol] are violated by action directly attributable to a State Party […] may give rise […] to application of the system of individual petitions governed by Articles 44 to 51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention.” There can be no doubt that the intention of the States as regards the Court’s competence to rule on violations of the Protocol of San Salvador are restricted to trade union rights and the right to education. 88. Nevertheless, the Court considers that the fact that Article 19(6) of the Protocol of San Salvador restricts the competence of this Court exclusively to examine violations of certain rights by means of the system of individual petitions, should not be interpreted as a precept that limits the scope of the rights protected by the Convention, or the possibility of the Court examining violations of those rights. To the contrary, the Court notes that a systematic interpretation of both treaties, made in good faith, leads to the conclusion that, since there is no express restriction in the Protocol of San Salvador that limits the Court’s competence to examine violations of the Convention, the Court should not assume this limitation. Moreover, the Court recalls that the fact that States adopt protocols or treaties on specific matters, and define the competence of this Court to examine predefined aspects of such treaties, does not entail a limitation of the Court’s competence to examine violations of the American Convention in relation to substantive aspects regulated in the two treaties.87 In this regard, the Court recalls that Article 77 of the Convention establishes the possibility that any State Party or the Commission may submit proposed protocols to the Convention “with a view to gradually including other rights and freedoms within its system of protection.” 89. Accordingly, the Court considers that there are no indications that, with the adoption of the Protocol of San Salvador, the States sought to limit the Court’s competence to examine violations of Article 26 of the American Convention. In this regard, the Court notes that if the American Convention is not expressly amended by a subsequent act of the States, the corresponding interpretation should be less restrictive as regards its scope in relation to the protection of human rights. Furthermore, the Court recalls that Article 76 of the American Convention establishes a specific procedure for amendments, which require the ratification of two-thirds of the States Parties to the Convention. Thus, it would be contradictory to consider that the adoption of the Additional Protocol, which did not require such a high margin of ratification as an amendment to the American Convention, could modify the content and scope of the latter’s effects. Consequently, the Court finds that the mere existence of Article 19(6) of the Protocol of San Salvador does not allow conclusions to be inferred that would establish restrictions to the relationship between Articles 26, 1(1), 2, 62 and 63 of the Convention. B.1.3. Teleological interpretation 90. Third, the Court must make a teleological interpretation of Article 26 of the Convention. The Court recalls that a teleological interpretation examines the purpose of the Article 19(6) of the Protocol of San Salvador establishes: “[a]ny instance in which the rights established in paragraph (a) of Article 8 and in Article 13 are violated by action directly attributable to a State Party to this Protocol may give rise, through participation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, when applicable, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to application of the system of individual petitions governed by Articles 44 through 51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights.” 86 Mutatis mutandi, Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2006. Series C No. 160, para. 276, and Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 225. 87 31