17 should be calculated. Similarly, a time limit in months should be calculated as “calendar months.”47 Consequently, even though the last day of the period was a Sunday, the representatives should have sent the brief on that date and not on the following working day. Despite this, the Court does not consider that admitting the representatives’ brief in these specific circumstances affects legal certainty or the procedural balance of the parties, because it was received with a minimum delay.48 61. Also, regarding the evidence provided with this brief, even though Article 36 of the Rules of Procedure establishes that the representatives have two months from the notification of the application to present their pleadings, motions and evidence, Article 26 of these Rules establishes that, if the pleadings and motions brief is remitted electronically, the original and the accompanying evidence “shall be submitted” (“deverão ser remitidos” [Note: must be forwarded in the Portuguese version]), within seven days at the latest.49 It can therefore be interpreted, as the representatives have, that the said term of seven days refers to the act of the parties sending the said documents, and not to their reception by the Court.50 62. Furthermore, the Court notes that the State had a copy of the pleadings and motions brief as of April 10, 2008, received nine of the twelve attachments mentioned in the said brief on May 20, 2008, and finally on May 23, 2008, received all the attachments. The extension granted, ex officio, by the President on May 20, 2008, for the State to present its answer to the application by July 7, 2008, was substantially the same as the time that elapsed between the expiry of the period stipulated in Article 26(1) of the Rules of Procedure and the date on which the State received the original pleadings and motions brief and its attachments. 63. Despite the State’s affirmation that “the adversarial principle was violated, because it had to make urgent unexpected changes in its defense to answer new arguments by the representatives, and that it had been granted an extension of five weeks, which was less than the delay incurred by the representatives,” it did not indicate what the supposed “new arguments of the representatives” were or the reasons that justified the difficulty in 47 Cf. Rules of Procedure of the Court. Article 2. Definitions, subparagraphs 11 and 21. 48 In the Kimel case, the Court indicated that: “[a]s to the two-day delay incurred by the representatives in submitting their brief of closing arguments, the Court bears in mind that, according to its prior decisions in similar cases, ‘the formalities inherent to certain branches of domestic law do not apply under International Human Rights Law, the main purpose of which is the due and adequate protection of such rights.’ Hence, it considers that such delay does not amount to an excessive term which may be the grounds for rejecting said brief, taking into consideration that the access of individuals to the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights is particularly relevant for the elucidation of the facts and the determination of possible reparation measures”. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008 Series C No. 177, para. 12. Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009, Series C No. 197, para. 13; Case of Escué Zapata v. Colombia. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of December 20, 2006, tenth considering paragraph; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148, para. 117, and The “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections. Judgment of January 25, 1996. Series C No. 23, paras. 37 and 39. 49 This expression corresponds, in the Spanish and French versions of the Rules of Procedure to “deberán ser remitidos” and “doivent être présentés,” respectively. 50 To avoid the possibility of ambiguity in the interpretations of this time limit, the Rules of Procedure of the Court in force as of March 24, 2009 establish: Article 27(1). Filing of briefs The application, the answer thereto, the brief containing pleadings, motions, and evidence, as well as any other written material addressed to the Court, may be presented in person, by courier, facsimile, telex, mail, or any other method generally used. When any such material is transmitted to the Court by electronic means, the original documents and annexes must be submitted to the Tribunal within a nonrenewable term of 21 days as from the expiration of the deadline established to submit those documents. To ensure the authenticity of the documents the Court shall have an adequate protocol.