21 72. Regarding the observations made by the parties, in keeping with the criteria reiterated in its case law, the Court considers that it cannot assess alone the testimony of Arlei José Escher, Delfino José Becker, Pedro Alves Cabral and Celso Aghinoni, alleged victims in this case, or that of Teresa Cofré and Marli Brambilla Kappaum, who were named as presumed victims in the representatives’ pleadings and motions brief, since they all have a direct interest in the case; the Court will therefore assess them in conjunction with the whole body of evidence in the proceedings.58 73. Second, in relation to the observations on the way in which the written statements were made, the Court notes that: (a) the opinion of the expert witness Sérgio Sauer was made before notary public; (b) a notary public authenticated the signatures on the testimony of Sadi Pansera and Rolf Hackbart, and on the opinion of the expert witness Luiz Flávio Gomes, and (c) the other five statements were made before an official in the Prosecutor General’s Office, in keeping with the request presented by the representatives and the Commission and granted by the Court (supra note 52). 74. In this regard, the Court considers it opportune to recall that the proceedings before it are not subject to the same formalities as domestic judicial proceedings.59 Thus, on previous occasions, the Court has admitted sworn statements that were not made before notary public, when this did not affect the legal certainty and procedural balance between the parties.60 In the instant case, the Court finds that there are no grounds to consider that the admission of the contested statements, namely those where the signature was certified by a notary public, has affected the legal certainty or the procedural balance of the parties. In any case, the deponent did not reject or ignore the content of the testimony attributed to him but, by his signature certified before notary public, assured that he was the author of that statement, assuming the legal consequences of that act. Based on the foregoing, the Court admits as evidence the statements on which the signature of the witness or the expert witness appears duly certified by a notary or other public official authorized to authenticate documents, and will assess them together with the entire body of evidence, applying the rules of sound judicial discretion and taking into consideration the objections of the parties.61 the facts about which she was questioned and her replies were evasive, lacking precision and objective information; (c) the expert opinion of Sérgio Sauer sought to indicate that, in Brazil, a regime criminalizing social movements and of omission by the State was in force, and it therefore vehemently rejected” this expert opinion. Brazil indicated that, regarding “the actions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, it was processing before the Inter-American Commission […] a request for information from the state […]. Given that the matter could possibly become a petition or a case before the [Commission], [the Court] should not consider comments made by the expert witness [Sérgio] Sauer on the matter mentioned at this time, because […] it could lead to a possible bis in idem in the international sphere.” Among other matters, the State submitted information on investments in infrastructure and the number of families settled to “correct information presented by the said expert witness”; and (d) the witnesses, Pedro Alves Cabral, Arlei José Escher and Delfino José Becker, revealed that they were not aware of several details of the facts and could not even indicate the judicial measures related to the said events. The State underscored that they had affirmed that COANA and ADECON had no links to MST, and therefore asked for rectification of the information provided to the case file by the Commission and the representatives. Brief of the State of November 28, 2008 (merits file, tome IV, folios 1102 to 1106). 58 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo, supra note 55, para. 43; Case of Perozo et al., supra note 18, para. 103, and Case of Kawas Fernández, supra note 35, para. 40. 59 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al., supra note 46, para. 71; Case of Perozo et al., supra note 18, para. 32, and Case of Kawas Fernández, supra note 35, para. 82. 60 The Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120, para. 39; Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No. 152, para. 46, and The La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163, para. 62. 61 Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters, supra note 60, para. 40; Carpio Nicolle et al. v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2004. Series C No. 117, para. 72, and Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 46.