34 came into force, because it was absorbed by the second authorization, granted for the application made by [Sergeant Silva].” The first phase of interceptions extended until May 26, 1999, and the second phased took place from June 9 to 23 the same year, thus respecting the 15-day limit established in Law No. 9,296/96, renewable for a similar period. Major Neves did not act with malice or criminal intent when he applied for the interception, because his application included the transcript of a citation from legal doctrine referring to the extensive jurisdiction of the Military Police – which could have induced Judge Khater in error. In addition, he communicated the investigative purpose of the application officially to the Secretary of Security at the time. Also, Law No. 9,296/96 allowed a judge to order telephone interceptions ex officio, in order to overcome possible defects concerning the alleged lack of competence of the authorities requesting them. Regarding the participation of the Prosecutor General’s Office in the monitoring petition, the State argued that Article 6 of the said Act did not require this Office to be notified before the interception was authorized, but rather when the measure was implemented. In addition, it indicated that a possible flaw in the monitoring application would result in the nullity of the evidence provided by this measure, if it was produced in a criminal proceeding, and would not prejudice the honor and dignity of the individuals involved. The State added that “the alleged victims […] were not adversely affected by the evidence that was produced unlawfully,” because the recorded tapes were not used as evidence in a criminal action against them, but were incinerated ex officio on April 23, 2002. 124. Similarly, the State argued that there was no inertia in the investigation into the facts related to the telephone interception and that the conduct of those involved had been examined in the criminal, administrative and civil spheres. The State took all pertinent measures to process the criminal action normally and even examined the conduct of Judge Khater by means of an administrative procedure. The State also indicated that the inaction of the alleged victims, because they failed to use all the appropriate remedies, particularly the civil actions for compensation and the mandado de segurança, could not give rise to the State’s international responsibility. In brief, it indicated that the said individuals had been heard and had received a response to all their claims; accordingly, it could not be said that Article 11 had been violated owing to the alleged omission of the Judiciary to examine and resolve the matter. * * * 125. The COANA and ADECON telephone lines were intercepted from 14 to 26 May, 1999, and from 9 to 30 June, 1999. The body of evidence in this case shows clearly that the telephone conversations of the alleged victims Celso Aghinoni, Arlei José Escher and Dalton Luciano de Vargas were intercepted and recorded by State agents (supra para. 97). 126. The other alleged victims, Delfino José Becker and Pedro Alves Cabral, were not mentioned in the summaries of the recorded fragments presented by Major Neves to the Loanda Court. 127. The Court has established that the use of circumstantial evidence, presumptions and indications to found a judgment is legitimate, “provided consistent conclusions about the facts can be inferred from them.”122 In this regard, the Court has indicated that, in principle, the burden of proving the facts on which a complaint is founded falls on the complainant; nevertheless, it has stressed that, contrary to domestic criminal law, in proceedings relating to human rights violations, the State’s defense cannot rest on the 122 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez, supra note 54, para. 130; Case of Perozo et al., supra note 18, para. 112, and Case of Kawas Fernández, supra note 35, para. 95.