substantiated, which hindered the possibility of questioning them.95 They argued, therefore, that the remedies presented were not appropriate nor effective to obtain judicial protection and, therefore, violated the rights established in Articles 7(6) and 25(1) of the Convention.96 89. Initial detentions. - The State denied responsibility for the alleged unlawfulness of the detentions. It explained that the detentions were carried out “by the then Technical Corps of the Judicial Police by means of orders from that institution and that they were based on the provisions of Article 71 of the Code of Criminal Prosecution,97 in concurrence with Articles 45 and 46 of the Organic Law of Amparo on Constitutional Rights and Guarantees.” 90. Venezuela also pointed out that, in addition to the aforementioned provisions, the orders of November 23, 1998 and February 28, 1999 of the TJP, that decreed the “continuation” of the “preventive detentions” of María Angélica González and Belkis González, in the first case, as well as those of Wilmer Antonio Barliza González, Luis Guillermo González and Olimpiades González, in the second, refer to Article 75 of the CCP. The State cited those orders that indicate that the detentions were due to the existence of “evidence” that leads to the “presumption” of the “participation” of the detainees in criminal acts. As to the detention of Fernando González, Venezuela referred to the police minutes of November 23, 1998, which indicated that he appeared at the police station with a vehicle that “appeared mentioned in the orders” and that he was detained “in order to continue the investigations.” The State added that all of the detentions were later confirmed judicially on December 10, 1998 and February 12, 1999, respectively, on the basis of Article 182 of the CCP.98 91. Preventive deprivations of liberty. – The State denied that the preventive detentions were arbitrary since they were “legitimate and proportionate” in relation to the crime that was being investigated, which was homicide. It manifested that the “first evidence” suggested the participation of the persons who were deprived of their liberty. It argued that these measures were not unreasonable but, on the contrary, were due to the “compliance of the duty to protect the security of persons,” and were the result of The Court notes that the representatives referred to the requests of the alleged victims that were made after the judicial decisions of December 10, 1998 and February 12, 1999 and that, depending on the cases, confirmed the deprivations of liberty ordered by the police. The Commission, which also pointed out the two types of requests of the alleged victims with respect to their deprivation of liberty, appears not to refer to the same two named by the representatives. Its Merits Report, in the relevant part, refers to a first group of requests of alternative measures of preventive detention that were never answered, and to another that was denied because it was held that there was a failure to comply with the provisions of Article 259 of the New Organic Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts show that the requests related to the deprivation of liberty formulated after December 10, 1998 and February 12, 1999 were answered and, thus, the first claim of the Commission appears to refer to requests prior to those dates. 95 96 The Commission clarified that Olimpiades and Luis Guillermo González were releaed when the Public Ministry decided not to accuse them and not as a consequence of the effectiveness of the remedies. The State emphasized that the CCP governed the criminal procedure in Venezuela until it was replaced by the COPP on July 1, 1999. 97 Venezuela stated that that provision “clearly” determined the “circumstances that should be taken into account to order the deprivation of liberty of any person, namely: i) the commission of a punishable act; ii) that the crime committed merits corporal punishment; iii) that the criminal act had not been prescribed, and iv) that there are sufficient and substantiated grounds of the guilt of a person.” It expressed that “all of the foregoing must be established by the court by means of a duly substantiated act” and that this was done in this case 98 24